CSE 331
Software Design and Implementation

Lecture 23
Verified Systems

Zach Tatlock / Spring 2018

Software Infrastructure

Software Infrastructure is Shaky



Software Infrastructure is Shaky

Software Infrastructure is Shaky



When exhaustive testing is impossible, our trust can only be based on proof.



Edsger W. Dijkstra
Under the Spell of Leibniz's Dream



... not just a dream!

Proof Assistant Based Verification

Code in language suited for reasoning

Develop correctness proof in synch

Fully formal, *machine checkable* proof

Proof Assistant Based Verification

Verified Compiler: CompCert [*Leroy POPL 06*]

Compiler	*Bugs Found*
GCC	122
LLVM	181
CompCert	**?**

[*Yang et al. PLDI 11*]

Proof Assistant Based Verification

Verified Compiler: CompCert [Leroy POPL 06]

Compiler	Bugs Found
GCC	122
LLVM	181
CompCert	0

[Yang et al. PLDI 11]
[Vu et al. PLDI 14]

Verified OS kernel: seL4 [Klein et al. SOSP 09]

realistic implementation guaranteed bug free

Proof Assistant Based Verification

Verified Compiler: CompCert [Leroy POPL 06]

Compiler | Bugs Found

Verified OS kernel: seL4 [Klein et al. SOSP 09]

realistic implementation guaranteed bug free



Promise

no prog errors

Today



Promise

no prog errors

Today

prog error → patch

Promise

Proof

⇓

no prog errors

Today

prog error → patch

Proof Burden

Promise

Proof

⇓

no prog errors

The Burden of Proof

1. Initial proofs require heroic effort

   CompCert: *70% proof, vast majority of effort*

   seL4: *200,000 line proof for 9,000 lines of C*

2. Code updates require re-proving

   CompCert: *adding opts* [*Tristan POPL 08, PLDI 09, POPL 10*]

   seL4: *changing RPC took 17% of proof effort*

Mitigating the Burden of Proof

1: Scaling proofs to critical infrastructure

⇨ *Formal shim verification for large apps*

QUARK: browser with security guarantees

2: Evolving formally verified systems

Reflex DSL exploits domain for proof auto

Fully Formal Verification

Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification

emacs@gear-ubuntu-32

File Edit Options Buffers Tools Coq Proof-General

```
Fixpoint factorial n :=
  match n with
  | O   => 1
  | S m => n * factorial m
  end.
```

program in a purely functional language

Fully Formal Verification

emacs@gear-ubuntu-32

File Edit Options Buffers Tools Coq Proof-General Holes Help

```
Fixpoint factorial n :=
  match n with
  | O   => 1
  | S m => n * factorial m
  end.

Definition monotonic f :=
  forall a b,
  a <= b ->
  f a <= f b.
```

specification characterizes desired behavior



Fully Formal Verification

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```
Fixpoint factorial n :=
  match n with
  | O   => 1
  | S m => n * factorial m
  end.

Definition monotonic f :=
  forall a b,
  a <= b ->
  f a <= f b.

Theorem example :
  monotonic factorial.
Proof.
  ...
```

claim program satisfies spec

construct proof *interactively*

Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Fully Formal Verification



Formally Verify a Browser?!

Formally Verify a Browser?!

Millions of LOC

Web Browser

Formally Verify a Browser?!

Millions of LOC

High performance



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

Millions of LOC

High performance

Loose access policy

Formally Verify a Browser?!



Millions of LOC

High performance

Loose access policy

Constant evolution

Formally Verify a Browser?!



Isolate

sandbox untrusted code

Formally Verify a Browser?!



Isolate
sandbox untrusted code

Implement shim
guards resource access

Formally Verify a Browser?!



Isolate
sandbox untrusted code

Implement shim
guards resource access

Verify shim
prove security policy

Formal Shim Verification



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Formal Shim Verification



Isolate
Implement shim
Verify shim

Applies when:
1. sys fits architecture
2. policy over resources
browser, httpd, sshd, ...

Formal Shim Verification

Key Insight: *Focus Effort*

- Guarantee sec props for entire system
- Only implement and prove small shim
- Radically ease verification burden
- Prove *actual code* correct

Mitigating the Burden of Proof

1: Scaling proofs to critical infrastructure

⇨ *Formal shim verification for large apps*

QUARK: browser with security guarantees

2: Evolving formally verified systems

Reflex DSL exploits domain for proof auto

Mitigating the Burden of Proof

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Formal shim verification for large apps

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Reflex DSL exploits domain for proof auto

Browsers: Critical Infrastructure

Browsers: Vulnerable



Pwn2Own hacking contest puts record $560K on the line

Google back as co-sponsor after organizer changes rules

By Gregg Keizer
January 18, 2013 10:57 AM ET 1 Comment

Like 76 +Briefcase More

Computerworld - HP TippingPoint, the long-time organizer of the annual Pwn2Own hacking contest, has revamped the challenge for the second year running and will offer cash awards exceeding half a million dollars, more than five times the amount paid out last year, the company said yesterday.

The 2013 edition of the contest will offer $560,000 in potential prize money to hackers who demonstrate exploits of previously-unknown vulnerabilities in Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer (IE) or Safari, or the Adobe Reader, Adobe Flash or Oracle Java browser plug-ins.

Prizes will be awarded on a sliding schedule, with $100,000 for the first to hack Chrome on Windows 7 or IE10 on Windows 8. From there, payments will fall to $75,000 for IE9 and slide through a number of targets before ending at $20,000 for Java. Prizes will also be given for exploiting Adobe Flash and Adobe Reader ($70,000 each), Safari ($65,000) and Firefox ($60,000).

About the Java award, Kostya Kortchinsky, a researcher who now works for Microsoft, quickly tweeted, "ZDI giving out $20k for free," referring to the Oracle software's recent vulnerabilities.

Pwn2Own will run March 6-8 at the CanSecWest security conference in Vancouver, British Columbia.

Defenses / Policies:

[*Jang et al. W2SP*]

[*Stamm et al. WWW*]

[*Jackson et al. W2SP*]

[*Barth et al. CCS*]

[*Singh et al. OAKLAND*]

...

Complex + Implementation Bugs

Quark: Verified Browser



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

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

Resources

network

persistent storage

user interface

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Quark browser kernel

code, spec, proof in Coq

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

browser components

run as separate procs

strictly sandboxed

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

browser components

run as separate procs

strictly sandboxed

talk to kernel over pipe

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

two component types

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

two component types

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

two component types

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

two component types

written in Python, manages single domain

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

two component types

WebKit tabs

cookie managers

Quark:Verified Browser



Resources

Shim

Untrusted Code

two component types

WebKit tabs

cookie managers

several instances each

Quark:Verified Browser



Quark:Verified Browser

Quark Kernel

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, Proof

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep ...
```

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  ...
```

kernel state

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  ...
```

Unix-style select to find a component pipe ready to read

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

case: `f` is user input

case: `f` is tab pipe

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      ...

  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

read command from user over `stdin`

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          ...

      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

user wants to create and focus a new tab

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          t <- mk_tab();
          ...

      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

create a new tab

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          t <- mk_tab();
          write_msg(t, Render);
          ...
      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

tell new tab to render itself

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          t <- mk_tab();
          write_msg(t, Render);
          return (t, t::tabs)
      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

return updated state

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          t <- mk_tab();
          write_msg(t, Render);
          return (t, t::tabs)
      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          t <- mk_tab();
          write_msg(t, Render);
          return (t, t::tabs)
      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

handle other user commands

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          t <- mk_tab();
          write_msg(t, Render);
          retu
      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

handle requests from tabs

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

```
Definition kstep(focused_tab, tabs) :=
  f <- select(stdin, tabs);
  match f with
  | Stdin =>
      cmd <- read_cmd(stdin);
      match cmd with
      | AddTab =>
          t <- mk_tab();
          write_msg(t, Render);
          return (t, t::tabs)
      | ...
  | Tab t =>
      ...
```

Quark Kernel: *Code*, Spec, Proof

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Safety properties to mitigate attacks

restrict kernel behavior to only safe executions

Example: mitigate phishing attacks

prevent tricks that get users to divulge secrets

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Safety properties to mitigate attacks

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

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

`read(), write(), open(), write(), ...`

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

trace: all syscalls made by Quark kernel during execution

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs



Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs



structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Example: address bar correctness

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Example: address bar correctness

```
forall trace tab domain,
```

for *any* trace, tab, and domain

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Example: address bar correctness

```
forall trace tab domain,
  quark_produced(trace)     ∧
  ...
```

if Quark could have produced this trace

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Example: address bar correctness


```
forall trace tab domain,
  quark_produced(trace)     ∧
  tab = cur_tab(trace)      ∧
  ...
```

and **tab** is the selected tab in this trace

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Example: address bar correctness


```
forall trace ta
  quark_produce
  tab = cur_ta (trace)      ∧
  domain = addr_bar(trace) ->
  ...
```

and **domain** displayed in address bar for this trace

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Example: address bar correctness


```
forall trace tab do
  quark_produced(tr
  tab = cur_tab(tra
  domain = addr_ba
  domain = tab_domain(tab)
```

then **domain** is the domain of the focused tab

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Specify correct behavior wrt syscall seqs

structure of produceable traces supports spec & proof

Example: address bar correctness

```
forall trace tab domain,
  quark_produced(trace)      ∧
  tab = cur_tab(trace)       ∧
  domain = addr_bar(trace)  ->
  domain = tab_domain(tab)
```

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Formal Security Properties

Tab Non-Interference

no tab affects kernel interaction with another tab

Cookie Confidentiality and Integrity

cookies only accessed by tabs of same domain

Address Bar Integrity and Correctness

address bar accurate, only modified by user action

Quark Kernel: Code, *Spec*, Proof

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, *Proof*

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, *Proof*

Prove kernel code satisfies sec props

by induction on traces Quark can produce

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, *Proof*

Prove kernel code satisfies sec props

by induction on traces Quark can produce



induction hypothesis:
trace valid up to this point

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, *Proof*

Prove kernel code satisfies sec props

by induction on traces Quark can produce



induction hypothesis:
trace valid up to this point

proof obligation:
still valid after step?

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, *Proof*



induction hypothesis:
trace valid up to this point

proof obligation:
still valid after step?

Proceed by case analysis on `kstep()`

what syscalls can be appended to trace?

will they still satisfy all security properties?

prove each case interactively in proof assistant

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, *Proof*

Proving required diverse range of tools

monads *encoding I/O in functional language*

Hoare logic *reasoning about imperative programs*

op. semantics *defining correctness of Quark kernel*

linear logic *proving resources created / destroyed*

YNot

[*Naneveski et al. ICFP 08*]

Quark Kernel: Code, Spec, Proof

Key Insight: *FSV Effective*

Guarantee sec props for browser

Use state-of-the-art components

Only prove simple browser kernel

Formally Verified Browser!



Extending Quark

Filesystem access, sound, history

could be implemented w/out major redesign

Finer grained resource accesses

support mashups and plugins

Liveness properties

no blocking, kernel eventually services all requests

Trusted Computing Base

Infrastructure we assume correct

bugs here can invalidate our formal guarantees

Fundamental	Statement of security properties Coq (soundness, proof checker)
Eventually Verified [active research]	OCaml [VeriML] Tab Sandbox [RockSalt] Operating System [seL4] ...

Quark Development Effort

150 lines of security props

900 lines of kernel code

4,500 lines of proofs

1,000,000 lines of WebKit

Quark Development Effort

150 lines of secu

900 lines of kernel code

4,500 lines of proofs

1,000,000 lines of We

week

months

Mitigating the Burden of Proof

1: Scaling proofs to critical infrastructure

Formal shim verification for large apps

⇨ *QUARK: browser with security guarantees*

2: Evolving formally verified systems

Reflex DSL exploits domain for proof auto

Mitigating the Burden of Proof

1: Scaling proofs to critical infrastructure

Formal shim verification for large apps

QUARK: browser with security guarantees

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Struggle Against Formality Inertia

Adding cookies to Quark quite difficult

all the pieces already there, still took over a month

Proof updates repetitive and shallow

sensitive proof scripts, changes not mechanical

```
match svec_ith PAYREST i as _vi return
   forall (EQ: (svec_ith (projT2 (existT vcdesc' ENVD_SIZE PAYREST)) i) = _vi),
   match _vi as __d return (base_term (existT vcdesc' ENVD_SIZE PAYREST) __d -> Prop)
   with
   | Desc d => fun _ => True
   | Comp c => fun b=> FdSet.In
        (comp_fd (projT1 (eval_base_term (envd:=existT _ ENVD_SIZE PAYREST) erest b))) fds end
     match EQ in _ = __vi return base_term _ __vi with Logic.eq_refl =>
       Var (existT vcdesc' ENVD_SIZE PAYREST) i end
   ->
   match _vi as __d return (base_term (existT vcdesc' (S ENVD_SIZE) (PAY0, PAYREST)) __d -> Prop) with
   | Desc d => fun _ => True
   | Comp c => fun b =>
      FdSet.In (comp_fd (projT1 (eval_base_term (envd:=existT _ (S ENVD_SIZE) (PAY0, PAYREST)) (e0, erest) b))) fds end
     match EQ in _ = __vi return base_term _ __vi with Logic.eq_refl =>
       Var (existT vcdesc' (S ENVD_SIZE) (PAY0, PAYREST)) (Some i) end
with
| Desc d => _ | Comp c => _ end (Logic.eq_refl _)
```

Division of Labor *(to scale)*



Division of Labor

Ideal?



Division of Labor



Division of Labor



Division of Labor



Division of Labor



Reflex: a DSL for Reactive Systems

[PLDI *14*]

Exploit structure of app domain

kernel based archs, well suited to FSV design

```
Components = ...
Messages   = ...
```

e.g. tabs, cookie managers

e.g. GetCookie, MouseClick

Reflex: a DSL for Reactive Systems

[PLDI *14*]

Exploit structure of app domain

kernel based archs, well suited to FSV design

```
Components = ...
Messages   = ...

Handlers:
  When C sends M:
    ...

  When C′ s
    ...
```

when component **C** sends message **M** ...

... react by:

updating state

accessing resources

sending messages

loop free!

Reflex: a DSL for Reactive Systems

[PLDI *14*]

Exploit structure of app domain

kernel based archs, well suited to FSV design

Provide expressive spec language

subset of LTL and non-interference properties

```
forall d c,
  [Recv(Tab(d), CookieSet(c))]
  Enables
  [Send(CookieMgr(d), CookieSet(c))]
```

cookie integrity

Reflex: a DSL for Reactive Systems

[PLDI *14*]

Exploit structure of app domain

kernel based archs, well suited to FSV design

Provide expressive spec language

subset of LTL and non-interference properties

Auto prove user-provided specs

exploit domain, ensure all traces match spec

Counterexample-driven search discovers invariants.

Reflex: a DSL for Reactive Systems

[PLDI *14*]

Reflex Effective:

- Prototype sshd, browser, httpd
- Specify basic access controls
- Auto prove user-provided specs

Reflex: Evaluation

auto prove non-interference

Web browser	**Domains do not interfere, Cookie integrity, …**
SSH server	**No PTY access before authentication, At most 3 authentication attempts, …**
Web server	**Clients only spawned after successful login, File requests guarded by access control, …**

auto prove non-local props

Auto verified 33 properties (80% in < 2 minutes)

Reflex: Development Effort

Reflex : *Many reactive systems*

7500 lines of Coq

Web browser	**SSH server**	**Web server**

Quark Web browser :

5500 lines of Coq *Single reactive system*

Mitigating the Burden of Proof

1: Scaling proofs to critical infrastructure

Formal shim verification for large apps

QUARK: browser with security guarantees

2: Evolving formally verified systems

⇨ *Reflex DSL exploits domain for proof auto*



Double Trouble

```
x = 0.1 + 0.2;
if (x != 0.3)
  printf("wat.\n");
```

$$\frac{(-b)-\sqrt{b^2-4\cdot(a\cdot c)}}{2\cdot a}$$

Futz



Analyze

MPFR



Less Double Trouble







Neutron Beams

UW Medicine
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE



Neutron Beams

UW Medicine
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

EPICS







Thank You!

Goal: mitigate formality inertia

address scaling and evolving formally verified systems

1. Extend verification frontier

develop techniques to verify critical "pinch points"

2. Make verification accessible

equip domain experts with effective tools



Verifying Optimizations

Rich compiler correctness history:

McCarthy 67, Samet 75, Cousot 77, …

Already solved?

Compiler	*Bugs Found*
GCC	122
LLVM	181
CompCert	0

[*Yang et al. PLDI 11*]

many optimization bugs

lacks many optimizations

Verifying Optimizations

Verifying Optimizations



Verifying Optimizations





Verifying Optimizations





Verifying Optimizations





Verifying Optimizations



Verifying Optimizations



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Future Work

Generating and evaluating specs

techniques to ensure spec matches intuition

Even perfect program verification can only establish that a program meets its specification... Much of the essence of building a program is in fact the debugging of the specification.

Frederick P. Brooks, Jr.
No Silver Bullet



Software Infrastructure

Quark Usability



Browsers: Critical Infrastructure

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