## Testing

#### CSE 331 University of Washington

**Michael Ernst** 

## **Therac-25 radiation therapy machine**

Excessive radiation killed patients (1985-87)

- New design removed hardware interlocks. All safety checks are done in software.
- The equipment control task did not properly synchronize if the operator changed the setup too quickly.
- This was missed during testing, because it took

practice before operators could work quickly enough to trigger the problem.

Panama, 2000: ≥8 dead Many more! (NYT 12/28/2010)



### **Therac-**

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#### Investigating Safety of a Radiotherapy Machine Using System Models with Pluggable Checkers

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Abstract. Formal techniques for guaranteeing software correctness have made tremendous progress in recent decades. However, applying these techniques to real-world safety-critical systems remains challenging in practice. Inspired by goals set out in prior work, we report on a largescale case study that applies modern verification techniques to check safety properties of a radiotherapy system in current clinical use. Because of the diversity and complexity of the system's components (software, hardware, and physical), no single tool was suitable for both checking critical component properties and ensuring that their composition implies critical system properties. This paper describes how we used state-of-theart approaches to develop specialized tools for verifying safety properties of individual components, as well as an extensible tool for composing those properties to check the safety of the system as a whole. We describe the key design decisions that diverged from previous approaches and that enabled us to practically apply our approach to provide machine-checked guarantees. Our case study uncovered subtle safety-critical flaws in a prerelease of the latest version of the radiotherapy system's control software.

 ${\bf Keywords:}$  case study, safety-critical systems, SMT-based verification, lightweight formal methods

#### 1 Introduction

Formal techniques for guaranteeing software correctness have made tremendous progress in recent decades. However, applying these techniques to real-world safetycritical systems remains challenging for three reasons. First, using general-purpose tools to formally prove deep properties of a system component (e.g., functional correctness of a cryptographic primitive [6]) requires substantial expertise and manual effort. Second, many real systems contain components for which effective formal analysis is still an active research topic (e.g., formally guaranteeing liveness for a consensus protocol within a distributed system [22]), and thus in practice,

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35-87) <mark>s</mark>. All

#### <mark>erly</mark> e setup

#### it took



### **Mars Polar Lander**



Legs deployed → Sensor signal falsely indicated that the craft had touched down (130 feet above the surface) Then the descent engines shut down prematurely The error was traced to a single line of code Why didn't they blame the sensor?

## Software bugs cost money

- Inadequate infrastructure for software testing costs the U.S. \$22-\$60 billion per year (NIST, 2002)
- Software bugs cost global economy \$312 billion per year (Cambridge University, 2013)
- \$6 billion loss from 2003 blackout in NE USA & Canada
   Software bug in alarm system in Ohio power control room
- \$440 million loss by Knight Capital Group in 30 minutes (2012)
  - High-frequency trading system
- Economies and lives destroyed by austerity measures based on study linking national debt to slow growth (2010)

## Outline: Testing principles and strategies

- Purpose of testing
- Kinds of testing
- Heuristics for good test suites
- Black-box testing
- Clear-box testing and coverage metrics
- Regression testing
- NOT: tool details (JUnit, continuous integration)

## **Building Quality Software**

#### What affects software quality?

#### External

Correctness	Does it do what it supposed to do?
Reliability	Does it do it accurately all the time?
Efficiency	Does it do with minimum use of resources?
Integrity	Is it secure?
Internal	
Portability	Can I use it under different conditions?
Maintainability	Can I fix it?
Flexibility	Can I change it or extend it or reuse it?

#### Quality Assurance (QA)

The process of uncovering problems and improving the quality of software. Testing is a major part of QA.

# Software Quality Assurance (QA)

Testing plus other activities including:

- Static analysis (assessing code without executing it)
- Proofs of correctness (theorems about program properties)
- Code reviews (people reading each others' code)
- Software process (methodology for code development)
- ...and many other ways to find problems and increase confidence

No single activity or approach can guarantee software quality

"Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only proved it correct, not tried it." -Donald Knuth, 1977



# What can you learn from testing?

"Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show their absence!"

Edsgar Dijkstra *Notes on Structured Programming* 1970



Nevertheless testing is essential. Why?

## What is testing for?

Validation = reasoning + testing

- Make sure module does what it is specified to do
- Uncover problems, increase confidence

Two rules:

- 1. Do it early and do it often
  - Catch bugs quickly, before they have a chance to hide
  - Automate the process if you can
- 2. Be systematic
  - Have a strategy, and test everything eventually
  - If you thrash about randomly, the bugs will hide in the corner until you're gone

## **Kinds of testing**

Unit testing versus system/integration testing Black-box testing versus clear-box testing Specification testing versus implementation testing

Orthogonal choices (8 varieties total) Other kinds of testing exist

## Unit testing and system testing

Unit testing: one module's functionality Method, class, interface, package, component
Test the unit in isolation from all others If test fails, the defect is localized Difficult if the unit uses other libraries Difficult if the unit does mutations
Done early in the software lifecycle

- As soon as the implementation exists
- Whenever it changes

Don't do integration until unit tests pass

**System testing** = integration testing = end-to-end testing Run the whole system, ensure the pieces work together

### **Black-box tests and clear-box tests**

Black-box testing Tests depend only on the specification

Clear-box (= white-box = glass-box) testing The implementation influences test creation

Both types of tests pass for *any* implementation Black-box vs. clear-box affects choice of inputs

More details later in this lecture

## Implementing a specification

A spec may be partial or may be weak. An implementation is complete and has specific behavior.

- We saw this when comparing transition relations

Clients must only depend on what is in the spec. The implementer knows how the implementation behaves.

Your boss asks you to implement specification  $S_1$ 

You actually implement specification S<sub>2</sub> which is stronger

- S<sub>1</sub> says "returns some value that ...", S<sub>2</sub> says "returns smallest value that ..."
- $S_1$  says "returns a list that ...",  $S_2$  says, "returns a *sorted* list that ..."
- $S_1$  says "requires x > 0",  $S_2$  says, "requires x ≥ 0"
- S<sub>1</sub> says "requires y != null", S<sub>2</sub> says, "throws Exception if y == null"
- $S_2$  has a particular toString implementation

Your boss doesn't even realize you did this

Your coworkers only depend on S<sub>1</sub>

### **Specification and implementation tests**

A specification test verifies behavior guaranteed by the specification

An implementation test verifies additional behavior of the implementation

Ensures that your implementation behaves as designed One person's implementation detail is another person's specification

Specification vs. implementation tests affects assertions (can also broaden inputs)
Orthogonal to black-box vs. clear-box tests affects choice of inputs, within the spec's domain

## How is testing done?

#### Write the test

- 1) Choose input data/configuration
- 2) Define the expected outcome

#### Run the test

- 3) Run program/method on the input and record the results
- 4) Compare *observed* results to the *expected* outcome

### sqrt example

// throws: IllegalArgumentException if x<0
// returns: approximation to square root of x
public double sqrt(double x)</pre>

What are some values or ranges of *x* that might be worth probing?

x < 0 (exception thrown)</pre>

 $x \ge 0$  (returns normally)

around x = 0 (boundary condition)

perfect squares (sqrt(x) an integer), non-perfect squares

x<sqrt(x) and x>sqrt(x) - that's x<1 and x>1 (and x=1)

*Specific tests: say x = -1, 0, 0.5, 1, 4* 

#### What's so hard about testing?

"Just try it and see if it works..."

// requires:  $1 \leq x, y, z \leq 10000$ // effects: computes some f(x, y, z)int proc(int x, int y, int z)

Exhaustive testing would require 1 trillion runs! Sounds totally impractical – and this is a trivially small problem

Key problem: choosing test suite (partitioning of inputs) Small enough to finish quickly Large enough to validate the program

### **Approach: Partition the Input Space**

Ideal test suite:

Identify sets with same behavior

Try one input from each set

Two problems



- 1. Notion of the same behavior is subtle Naive approach: execution equivalence Better approach: revealing subdomains
- 2. Discovering the sets requires perfect knowledge Use heuristics to approximate cheaply

#### Naive approach: Execution equivalence

```
// <u>returns</u>: if x < 0 ⇒ returns -x
// otherwise ⇒ returns x
int abs(int x) {
    if (x < 0) return -x;
    else return x;
}</pre>
```

All x < 0 are execution equivalent: program takes same sequence of steps for any x < 0

All  $x \ge 0$  are execution equivalent

Suggests that {-3, 3}, for example, is a good test suite

#### **Execution equivalence is not enough**

Consider the following buggy code:
// returns: x < 0 ⇒ returns -x
// otherwise ⇒ returns x
int abs(int x) {
 if (x < -2) return -x;
 else return x;
}</pre>

Two execution behaviors:x < -2 $x \ge -2$ Three behaviors:x < -2 (OK)x = -2 or -1 (bad) $x \ge 0$  (OK)

{-3, 3} does not reveal the error!

### Heuristic: Revealing Subdomains

- A subdomain is a subset of possible inputs
- A subdomain is *revealing* for error E if either:
  - Every input in that subdomain triggers error E, or
  - No input in that subdomain triggers error E
- Need to test only one input from each subdomain
  - If subdomains cover the entire input space, then we are *guaranteed* to detect the error if it is present
- The trick is to guess these revealing subdomains

#### Example

For buggy **abs**, what are revealing subdomains?

// returns:  $x < 0 \Rightarrow returns -x$ // otherwise  $\Rightarrow returns x$ int abs(int x) { if (x < -2) return -x; else return x; }

Example sets of subdomains:

```
      ... {-2} {-1} {0} {1} ...

      {..., -4, -3} {-2, -1} {0, 1, ...}

      Which is best?

      ... {-6, -5, -4} {-3, -2, -1} {0, 1, 2} ...
```

Heuristics for designing test suites = heuristics for choosing inputs = heuristics for dividing the domain

A good heuristic gives:

- few subdomains
- For all errors E in some class of errors, high probability that some subdomain is revealing for E

Different heuristics target different classes of errors In practice, combine multiple heuristics

## **Black Box Testing**

Heuristic: Explore each case/path in the specification Procedure is a black box: (interface visible, internals hidden) but its spec is like an implementation you can test

Example

 $\begin{array}{ll} // & effects: & a > b \Rightarrow returns \ a \\ // & a < b \Rightarrow returns \ b \\ // & a = b \Rightarrow returns \ a \\ \end{array}$ 

3 cases, so 3 tests: (4, 3) => 4 (*i.e.* any input in the subdomain a > b) (3, 4) => 4 (*i.e.* any input in the subdomain a < b) (3, 3) => 3 (*i.e.* any input in the subdomain a = b)

#### **Black Box Testing: Advantages**

- Process is not influenced by component being tested
  - Assumptions embodied in code not propagated to test data.
  - Avoids "group-think" of making the same mistake.
- Robust with respect to changes in implementation
   Test data need not be changed when code is changed
- Allows for independent testers
  - Testers need not be familiar with code
  - Tests can be developed before the code

### **More Complex Example**

Write test cases based on cases in the specification

// returns: the smallest i such
// that a[i] == value
// throws: Missing if value is not in a
int find(int[] a, int value) throws Missing

Two obvious tests:

( [4, 5, 6], 5 ) => 1
( [4, 5, 6], 7 ) => throw Missing

Have we captured all the paths? ([4, 5, 5], 5) => 1 Must hunt for multiple cases (see effects, requires)

# **Heuristic: Boundary Testing**

Create tests at the edges of subdomains Why do this?

*,* off-by-one bugs

forgot to handle empty container, null, etc

arithmetic overflow

aliasing

Small subdomains at the edges of the "main" subdomains have a high probability of revealing these common errors

Also, you might have misdrawn the boundaries

## **Boundary Testing**

To define the boundary, need a *metric space* A distance metric that defines adjacent inputs One approach: operations define the metric space Two values are adjacent if one operation apart Point is on a boundary if either:

- There exists an adjacent point in a different subdomain
- Some basic operation cannot be applied to the point

Example: list of integers

Basic operations: create, insert, remove, ...

Adjacent values: <[2,3],[2,3,4]>, <[2,3],[2]>

Boundary value: [] (can't apply **remove**)

### **Other Boundary Cases**

#### Arithmetic

Smallest/largest values Zero

Objects

Null

Circular list

Same object passed to multiple arguments (aliasing)

### **Boundary Cases: Arithmetic Overflow**

#### // returns: |x|

#### public int abs(int x)

```
What are some values or ranges of x that might be worth probing?
    x < 0 (flips sign) or x ≥ 0 (returns unchanged)
    around x = 0 (boundary condition)
    Specific tests: say x = -1, 0, 1
How about...
    int x = Integer.MIN_VALUE; // x = -2147483648
    System.out.println(x<0); // true
    System.out.println(Math.abs(x)<0); // also true!</pre>
```

From Javadoc for Math.abs:

If the argument is Integer.MIN\_VALUE, the most negative representable int value, the result is that same value, which is negative

### **Boundary Cases: Duplicates & Aliases**

```
// modifies: src, dest
// effects: removes all elements of src and apends
// them in reverse order to the end of dest
<E> void appendList(List<E> src, List<E> dest) {
    while (src.size()>0) {
        E elt = src.remove(src.size()-1);
        dest.add(elt)
    }
}
```

What happens if src and dest refer to the same object?

This is *aliasing* 

It's easy to forget!

Watch out for shared references in inputs

## **Heuristic: Clear-box testing**

Focus: features not described by specification

- Control-flow details
- Performance optimizations
- Alternate algorithms for different cases

Common metric for test suite quality: Coverage

Goal: test suite covers (executes) all of the program Assumption:

high coverage  $\rightarrow\,$  good test suite  $\rightarrow\,$  few mistakes remain in the program

### **Clear-box motivation**

Some subdomains are not evident from the specification (which black-box testing uses

```
boolean[] primeTable = new boolean[CACHE SIZE];
boolean isPrime(int x) {
  if (x > CACHE SIZE) {
    for (int i = 2; i < x/2; i++) {
      if (x%i == 0)
         return false;
      return true;
     }
  } else {
    return primeTable[x];
  }
}
```

Subdomain boundary (execution difference) at x = CACHE\_SIZE

#### **Clear-box testing: advantages**

- Provides an important class of boundaries

   Yields useful test cases
- Gives an objective test suite quality metric (coverage)
- Disadvantages?

Tests may have same bugs as implementation Buggy code tricks you into complacency once you look at it

### Statement coverage is not enough

```
static int min (int a, int b) {
    int r = a;
    if (a <= b) {
        r = a;
      }
      return r;
}</pre>
```

Consider any test with  $a \le b$ , e.g., min(1,2)

It executes every instruction

It misses the bug

Statement coverage is not enough

Branch coverage = every conditional evaluates to true and false = every branch "goes both ways"

### Branch coverage is not enough

```
int quadrant(int x, int y) {
    int answer;
    if (x >= 0)
        answer = 1;
    else
        answer = 2;
    if (y < 0)
        answer = 4;
    return answer;
}</pre>
```



Consider a suite with two test inputs: (2,-2) and (-2,2)

- Achieves 100% branch coverage
- Misses the bug.

*Path coverage* = execute every path through the code

#### Path coverage example



# Varieties of coverage

### Covering all of the program:

Statement coverage Branch coverage Decision coverage Loop coverage Condition/decision coverage Path coverage

increasing number of test cases required

Infeasible or impossible

#### Limitations of coverage:

- 1. 100% coverage is not always a reasonable target 100% may be unattainable (dead code) High cost to approach the limit
- 2. Tested code is not necessarily correct Ex: defective **abs** method from earlier in lecture
- 3. Coverage is just a heuristic We really want the revealing subdomains

# Try to write unit tests

- Ideal: each test checks one component (method,...)
  - And checks only one aspect/behavior of that component
  - Test failure indicates the exact problem
  - Debugging is a breeze
- Reality: can't always test in complete isolation
  - Example: need to use observer(s) to see if creator, mutator, or producer yields correct results
    - If test of constructor fails, defect could be in creator *or* observer
  - Example: tested code calls other libraries (JDK)
- Advice: make each test depend on as little as possible
- Reality: your time is limited
  - Testing is of value, but any activity reaches diminishing returns
  - Goal: increase confidence to levels dictated by the business case

## **Pragmatics: Regression Testing**

Whenever you find a bug

- 1. Record the input that revealed the bug, plus the correct output
- 2. Add these to the test suite
- 3. Verify that the test suite fails
- 4. Fix the bug
- 5. Verify the fix

Why is this a good idea?

Ensures that your fix solves the problem

Don't add a test that succeeded to begin with! Helps to populate test suite with good tests Protects against regressions that reintroduce the bug It happened at least once, and it might happen again

## **Rules of Testing**

First rule of testing: *Do it early and do it often* 

Best to catch bugs soon, before they have a chance to hide.

Automate the process if you can

Regression testing will save time.

#### Second rule of testing: *Be systematic*

If you randomly thrash, bugs will hide in the corner until later Writing tests is a good way to understand the spec Think about revealing domains and boundary cases If the spec is confusing → change it and/or write more tests The spec can be buggy too Incorrect, incomplete, ambiguous, missing corner cases

When you find a bug  $\rightarrow$  write a test for it first and then fix it

## **Testing summary**

**Testing matters** 

You need to convince others that module works Catch problems earlier

Bugs become obscure beyond the unit they occur in Don't confuse *volume* with *quality* of test data Can lose relevant cases in mass of irrelevant ones Look for revealing subdomains Choose test data to cover Specification (black box testing) Code (clear box testing) Testing can't generally prove absence of bugs But it can increase quality and confidence