

A GLIMPSE OF AUCTION THEORY  
(CONTINUED) +  
DISTINCT ELEMENTS

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# AGENDA

- FINISH UP GLIMPSE OF AUCTION THEORY
- DISTINCT ELEMENTS

# AUCTIONS

- Companies like Google and Facebook make most of their money by selling ads.
- The ads are sold via auction.

## Facebook Ads bidding... 🤔 Is this an auction?

Yes! That's the first thing you need to understand to master bidding management of Facebook Ads. **When you're creating a new campaign, you're joining a huge, worldwide auction.**

You'll be competing with hundreds of thousands of advertisers to buy what Facebook is selling: Real estate on the News Feed, Messenger, Audience Network, and mobile apps to display your ads to the users.



# AN AUCTION IS A ...

- Game
  - Players: advertisers
  - Strategy choices for each player: possible bids
  - Rules of the game – made up by Google/Facebook/whoever is running the auction
- What do we expect to happen? How do we analyze mathematically?

## SPECIAL CASE: SEALED BID SINGLE ITEM AUCTION

- Say I decide to run an auction to sell my laptop and I let you be the bidders.
- If I want to make as much money as possible - what should the rules of the auction be?

### Some possibilities:

- **First price auction:** highest bidder wins; pays what they bid.
- **Second price auction:** highest bidder wins; pays second highest bid.
- **All pay auction:** highest bidder wins: all bidders pay what they bid.

Which of these will make me the most money?

Bidder	1	2	3	4
Bids	100	81	35	24




Payment	1st price	100	0	0	0
	2nd price	81	0	0	0
	All pay	100	81	35	24

## BIDDER MODEL

Each bidder has a value, say  $v_i$  for bidder  $i$ .  
*private information.*

Bidder is trying to maximize their "utility" -  
 the value of the item they get - price they pay.

$v_i = 95$   
 indiff  
 \$95 and  
 the item.



In a second price auction, it is always in your best interest to bid your value  
 $b_i := v_i$

2<sup>nd</sup> price auction is truthful

2 bidders

$v_1 \sim U[0, 100]$



sealed bids

$b_1$



$v_2 \sim U[0, 100]$



$b_2$



Winner



Payments

	2nd price	1st price	All pay auctn	
$v$	bid = $v$	bid = $\frac{v}{2}$	bid $\frac{v^2}{200}$	equal bidding strategy.



1st price auction. If each bidder bids half their value, then they maximize  $E$  (utility) value of other bidder

## Bayes-Nash eq

best response in expectation.

$$\begin{array}{cc}
 V_1 \sim U[0,100] & V_2 \sim U[0,100] \\
 \Downarrow & \Downarrow \\
 \text{bid } V_1 & \text{bid } V_2 \\
 = & =
 \end{array}$$

$$\text{payment} = \min(V_1, V_2)$$

Exp auctioneer revenue in 2nd price auction

a)  $E(\max(V_1, V_2))$

b)  $E\left(\frac{V_1 + V_2}{2}\right)$

c)  $E(\min(V_1, V_2))$

d) I don't know

(105, 100)

2 bids  
1/2, 1/2

v

2nd price

1st price

All pay auctn

bid = v

bid =  $\frac{v}{2}$

bid  $\frac{v^2}{200}$


equal bidding strategy

$E(\min(v_1, v_2))$

$E(\max(\frac{v_1}{2}, \frac{v_2}{2}))$

$E[\frac{v_1^2}{200} + \frac{v_2^2}{200}]$

exp auctioneer revenue



$= \frac{150}{3}$

$= \frac{150}{3}$


$= \frac{150}{3}$

$E[\min(v_1, v_2)] + E[\max(v_1, v_2)] = E(v_1 + v_2)$

$$E[\min(V_1, V_2)] = 100 - \frac{2}{3} \cdot 100 = \frac{100}{3}$$

$$\frac{2}{3} \cdot 100$$

$$= E(V_1) + E(V_2)$$
$$\left[ \frac{2}{3} \cdot 100 + \frac{2}{3} \cdot 100 \right]$$
$$\frac{100}{3}$$



### Revenue equivalence Thm

In equilibrium  
 $E(\text{auctioneer rev})$  same  
 in all 3 auctions.

$\Rightarrow E[\text{payment of each bidder same in all 3 auctions}]$

2nd price auction with reserve price  $r$   
 highest bidder wins if  $b_i \geq r$  pay  $\max(\text{2nd highest bid}, r)$

100	81	75
$r = 70$		

# DISTINCT ELEMENTS

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WITH MANY SLIDES BY LUXI WANG, SHREYA JAYARAMAN,  
ALEX TSUN AND JEFF ULLMAN

# DATA MINING

- In many data mining situations, the data is not known ahead of time.
- Examples:
  - Google queries
  - Twitter or Facebook status updates
  - Youtube video views
- In some ways, best to think of the data as an infinite stream that is non-stationary (distribution changes over time)

# STREAM MODEL

- Input elements (e.g. Google queries) enter/arrive one at a time.
- We cannot possibly store the stream.

Question: How do we make critical calculations about the data stream using a limited amount of memory?

# SOURCES OF THIS KIND OF DATA

- Sensor data
  - E.g. millions of temperature sensors deployed in the ocean
- Image data from satellites or surveillance cameras
  - E.g. London
- Internet and web traffic
  - E.g. millions of streams of IP packets
- Web data
  - E.g. Search queries on Google, clicks on Bing, etc.



# EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS

- Mining query streams
  - Google wants to know which queries are more frequent today than yesterday.
- Mining click streams
  - Facebook wants to know which of its ads are getting an unusual number of hits in the last hour.
- Mining social network news feeds
  - E.g., looking for trending topics on Twitter and Facebook, trending videos on TikTok

# MORE APPLICATIONS

- Sensor networks
  - Many sensors feeding into a central controller.
- IP packets
  - Gather congestion information for optimal routing
  - Detect denial-of-service attacks

# PROBLEM

user ids.




- Input: sequence of  $N$  elements  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N$  from a known universe  $U$  (e.g., 8-byte integers).
- Goal: perform a computation on the input, in a single left to right pass where
  - Elements processed in real time
  - Can't store the full data. => use minimal amount of storage while maintaining working "summary"

# WHAT CAN WE COMPUTE?

32, 12, 14, 32, 7, 12, 32, 7, 32, 12, 4,  
32 12 12 12 7 7 7 7 ... 4

- Some functions are easy:

- Min
  - Max
  - Sum
  - Average
- 

# COUNTING DISTINCT ELEMENTS

$x_1$   $x_2$   $x_3$   $x_4$   
32, 12, 14, 32, 7, 12, 32, 7, 32, 12, 4,


32, 12, 14, 7, 4

Applications:

- IP packet streams: How many distinct IP addresses or IP flows (source+destination IP, port, protocol)
  - Anomaly detection, traffic monitoring
- Search: How many distinct search queries on Google on a certain topic yesterday
- Web services: how many distinct users (cookies) searched/browsed a certain term/item
  - Advertising, marketing trends, etc.

# ANOTHER APPLICATION

You are the content manager at YouTube, and you are trying to figure out the **distinct** view count for a video. How do we do that?



Note: A person can view their favorite videos several times, but they only count as 1 **distinct** view!

# COUNTING DISTINCT ELEMENTS

32, 12, 14, 32, 7, 12, 32, 7, 32, 12, 4,

- Want to compute number of **distinct** keys in the stream.
- *How to do this without storing all the elements?*
  
- *Yet another super cool application of probability (and hashing)*

# A NAIVE SOLUTION, COUNTING!


Store the  $n$  **distinct** user IDs in a hash table.

Space requirement:  $O(n)$

#distinct  
elts  
in stream.

$x_i$

$h(x_i)$   
insert



Count





CONSIDERING THE NUMBER OF USERS OF YOUTUBE, AND THE NUMBER OF VIDEOS ON YOUTUBE, THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE.

Consider a hash function  $h: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow [0, 1]$   
 For distinct values in  $\mathcal{U}$ , the function maps to iid (independent and identically distributed)  $\text{Unif}(0, 1)$  random numbers.

$h(32) = 0.43$   
 $h(12) = 0.19$   
 $h(14) = 0.85$   
 $h(7) = 0.61$

Note that, if you were to feed in two equivalent elements, the function returns the **same** number.

$32, 12, 14, 32, 7, 12, 32, 7, 32, 12, 4,$   
 $0.43, 0.19, 0.85, 0.43, 0.61, 0.19, \dots$

track min hash value seen so far


$\min_{\text{hash value}} = \min (U_1, U_2, \dots, U_n)$   $n$  distinct elts in stream

## MIN OF IID UNIFORMS




If  $Y_1, \dots, Y_m$  are iid  $Unif(0,1)$ , where do we "expect" the points to end up?

$m = 1$



$m = 2$



$m = 4$

