Today’s two questions

- Why use formalisms in (at least) some requirements specifications?
- How do we build confidence in the correctness of a requirements specification?

Short answers

- Model checking and related techniques are extremely promising for helping improve the quality of (some limited, but important kinds of) software requirements specifications.
- Improve confidence in a specification by iterative checking of a different “view” of the specification.

Verification vs. falsification

- Ed Clarke has observed that this general area of improving confidence in a specification should probably be called falsification rather than verification.
- This is not so different from the shift in testing terminology:
  - Does a test case succeed or fail if it exposes a problem?

Model checking

- Evaluate temporal properties of finite state systems.
- Extremely successfully for hardware verification.
- Open question: applicable to software specifications?
The plan

- Basics of model checking
  - Explicit model checking
  - Symbolic model checking
- Applying model checking
  - Hardware
  - Software
  - Protocols, TCAS, …
- Counterexample checking

State Transition Graph

- One way to represent a finite state machine is as a state transition graph
  - $S$ is a finite set of states
  - $R$ is a binary relation that defines the possible transitions between states in $S$
  - $P$ is a function that assigns atomic propositions to each state in $S$
  - e.g., that a specific process holds a lock
- Other representations include regular expressions, etc.

State Transition Graph

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Example

- Three states
- Transitions as shown
- Atomic properties $a$, $b$, and $c$
- Given a start state, you can consider legal paths through the state machine

A computation tree

- From a given start state, you can represent all possible paths with an infinite computation tree
- Model checking allows us to answer questions about this tree structure

Temporal formulae

- Temporal logics allow us to say things like
  - Does some property hold true globally?
    - Top figure
  - Does some property inevitably hold true?
    - Bottom figure
  - Does some property potentially hold true?

Mutual exclusion example

- $N_1$ & $N_2$, non-critical regions of Process 1 and 2
- $T_1$ & $T_2$, trying regions
- $C_1$ and $C_2$, critical regions
- $AF(C_1)$ in lightly shaded state?
  - $C_1$ always inevitably true?
- $EF(C_1 \land C_2)$ in dark shaded state?
  - $C_1$ and $C_2$ eventually true?
Model checking

- A model checker takes as input the state machine description and a temporal logic formula and
  - either returns “true” or
  - returns “false” and gives a counterexample
    » a description of state transitions that leads to a counterexample of the temporal formula

How does it work? (in brief)

- An iterative algorithm that labels states in the transition graph with formulae known to be true
  - For a query Q
    » the first iteration marks all subformulae of Q of length 1
    » the second iteration marks them of length 2
    » this terminates since the formula is finite
  - The details of the logic indeed matter (but not at this level of description)

Example

- Q = T1 ⇒ AF C1
  - If Process 1 is trying to acquire the mutex, then it is inevitably true it will get it sometime
- Q = ¬T1 ∨ AF C1
  - Rewriting with DeMorgan’s Laws
- First, label all the states where T1, ¬T1, and C1 are true

Example

- Next mark all the states in which AF C1 is true, etc.
  - The algorithm tracks states visited using depth-first search
  - Slight variations for AF, AG, EF, EG, etc.
  - At termination, ¬T1 ∨ AF C1 is true everywhere

Examples in hardware

- This approach can be used to demonstrate properties of some protocols, such as the Alternating Bit Protocol
  » Senders send data
  » Receivers send acknowledgments
  » Garbled and lost messages can be detected
  » Must resend for garbled and lost messages and missing acknowledgments
  » ABP passes an “alternation” (control) bit

ABP state graph

- Produce state machines for Sender and Receiver
- Interleave them to produce a single machine
  » After state minimization, state graph has 251 states
ABP formulae

◆ AG(RcvMsg ⇒ A[RcvMsg U (¬RcvMsg U SndMsg)])
◆ AG(SndMsg ∧ Smsg ⇒ A[SndMsg U ...]
◆ Collectively, the (three) formulae imply that sending a message strictly alternates with receiving a message and that the proper message is received.

Limitations

◆ This approach is called explicit model checking, because the state graph is represented and traversed explicitly.
◆ When the state space is very large, this approach is computationally infeasible:
  – There has been lots of recent work on explicit model checkers, notably the MarΦ system at Stanford (Dill et al.)
  – Identifying isomorphic states is the central idea
  – Can be effective in situations with many replicated structures

Symbolic model checking

◆ State space can be huge (>2^{1000}) for many systems.
◆ Use implicit representation:
  – Data structure to represent transition relation as a boolean formula
◆ Algorithmically manipulate the data structure to explore the state space.
◆ Key: efficiency of the data structure

Binary decision diagrams (BDDs)

◆ “Folded decision tree”
◆ Fixed variable order
◆ Many functions have small BDDs:
  – Multiplication is a notable exception
◆ Can represent:
  – State machines (transition functions)
  – Temporal queries

BDD-based model checking

◆ Iterative, fixed-point algorithms that are quite similar to those in explicit model checking.
◆ Applying boolean functions to BDDs is efficient, which makes the underlying algorithms efficient.
◆ When the BDDs remain small, that is:
  – Variable ordering is a key issue

BDD-based successes in HW

◆ IEEE Futurebus+ cache coherence protocol
◆ Control protocol for Philips stereo components
◆ ISDN User Part Protocol
◆ ...
Software model checking

- Finite state software specifications
  - Reactive systems (avionics, automotive, etc.)
  - Hierarchical state machine specifications
    » Statecharts (Harel), RSML (Leveson)
- Not intended to help with proving consistency of specification and implementation

Why might model checking fail?

- Software is often specified with infinite state descriptions
  - We’ll come back to this later (counterexample checking)
- Software specifications may be structured differently from hardware specifications
  - Hierarchy
  - Representations and algorithms for model checking may not scale

Our approach at UW—try it!

- Applied model checking to the specification of TCAS II
  - Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
    » In use on U.S. commercial aircraft
    » http://www.faa.gov/and/and600/and620/newtcas.htm
    » FAA adopted specification
  - Initial design and development by Leveson et al.
- Joint with Anderson, Beame, Chan, Modugno, Reese

TCAS

- Warn pilots of traffic
  - Plane to plane, not through ground controller
  - On essentially all commercial aircraft
- Issue resolution advisories only
  - Vertical resolution only
  - Relies on transponder data

TCAS specification

- Irvine Safety Group (Leveson et al.)
  - Specified in RSML as a research project
    » RSML is in the Statecharts family of hierarchical state machine description languages
    » FAA adopted RSML version as official
- Specification is about 400 pages long
- This study uses: Version 6.00, March 1993
  - Not the current FAA version

TCAS—high-level structure

- Own_Aircraft
  - Sensitivity levels, Alt_Layer, Advisory_Status
- Other_Aircraft
  - Tracked, Intruder_State, Range_Test, Crossing, Sense Descend/Climb
Using SMV

- SMV is a BDD-based model checker
- It checks CTL formulas
  - A specific temporal logic

Iterative process

- Iterate SMV version of specification
- Clarify temporal formula
- Model environment more precisely
- Refine specification

Use of non-determinism

- Inputs from environment
  - Altitude := {1000…8000}
- Simplification of functions
  - Alt_Rate := 0.25*(Alt_Baro-ZP)/Delta_t
  - Alt_Rate := {-2000…2000}
- Unmodelled parts of specification
  - States of Other_Aircraft treated as non-deterministic input variables

Translating RSML to SMV

```
MODULE main
VAR
  state:{ON,OFF};
  on_event: boolean;
  off_event: boolean;
ASSIGN
  init(state) := OFF;
  next(state) := case
    state = ON & on_event: OFF;
    state = OFF & off_event: ON;
    1 : state;
  esac;
```

State encoding

- Flatten nested AND and nested OR states
- One variable for each OR state
  - An enumerated type of the alternatives
- VAR
  
  S: {A,B,C};
  T: {D,E};
  U: {F,G};

Synchrony hypothesis

- Handling an external event

```
DEFINE
  Stable := !Initiate_Move & !Move_Finished & !Rod_Updated & !Clock_Event
ASSIGN
  next(Move_Finished) := case
    Stable : 0;
    1 : state;
    esac;
  ...
```
Transitions

VAR RC: {Out, Mid, In};
ASSIGN
  T_Out_Mid : Mid;  T_Mid_In : In;
  T_Mid_Out : Out;  T_In_Mid : Mid;
  l : RC;
esac;

Non-deterministic transitions

◆ A machine is deterministic if at most one of T_A_B, T_A_C, etc. can be true
◆ Else non-deterministic
◆ Can encode non-deterministic transitions
next(S) := case
  T_A_B & T_A_C: {B,C};
  T_A_B : B;  T_A_C : C;
  l : S;
esac;

Checking properties
◆ Initial attempts to check any property generated BDDs of over 200MB
◆ First successful check took 13 hours
  – Has been reduced to a few minutes
◆ Partitioned BDDs
◆ Reordered variables
◆ Implemented better search for counterexamples

Property checking
◆ Domain independent properties
  – Deterministic state transitions
  – Function consistency
◆ Domain dependent
  – Output agreement
  – Safety properties
◆ We used SMV to investigate some of these properties on TCAS’ Own_Aircraft module

Disclaimer
The intent of this work is to evaluate symbolic model checking of state-based specifications, not to evaluate the TCAS II specification. Our study used a preliminary version of the specification, version 6.00, dated March, 1993. We did not have access to later versions, so we do not know if the issues identified here are present in later versions.

Deterministic transitions
◆ Do the same conditions allow for non-deterministic transitions?
◆ Inconsistencies were found earlier by other methods [Heimdahl and Leveson]
  – Identical conditions allowed transitions from Sensitivity Level 4 to SL 2 or to SL 5
◆ Our formulae checked for all possible non-determinism; we found this case, too
\[ \text{V}_{254a} := \text{MS} = \text{TA}_{-}\text{RA} | \text{MS} = \text{TA}_{-}\text{only} | \text{MS} = 3 | \text{MS} = 4 | \text{MS} = 5 | \text{MS} = 6 | \text{MS} = 7; \]
\[ \text{V}_{254b} := \text{ASL} = 2 | \text{ASL} = 3 | \text{ASL} = 4 | \text{ASL} = 5 | \text{ASL} = 6 | \text{ASL} = 7; \]
\[ \text{T}_{254} := (\text{ASL} = 2 \& \text{V}_{254a}) | (\text{ASL} = 2 \& \text{MS} = \text{TA}_{-}\text{only}) | (\text{V}_{254b} \& \text{LG} = 2 \& \text{V}_{254a}); \]
\[ \text{V}_{257a} := \text{LG} = 5 | \text{LG} = 6 | \text{LG} = 7 | \text{LG} = \text{none}; \]
\[ \text{V}_{257b} := \text{MS} = \text{TA}_{-}\text{RA} | \text{MS} = 5 | \text{MS} = 6 | \text{MS} = 7; \]
\[ \text{V}_{257c} := \text{MS} = \text{TA}_{-}\text{RA} | \text{MS} = \text{TA}_{-}\text{only} | \text{MS} = 3 | \text{MS} = 4 | \text{MS} = 5 | \text{MS} = 6 | \text{MS} = 7; \]
\[ \text{V}_{257d} := \text{ASL} = 5 | \text{ASL} = 6 | \text{ASL} = 7; \]
\[ \text{T}_{257} := (\text{ASL} = 5 | \text{V}_{257a} | \text{V}_{257b}) | (\text{ASL} = 5 \& \text{MS} = \text{TA}_{-}\text{only}) | (\text{ASL} = 5 \& \text{LG} = 2 \& \text{V}_{257a}) | (\text{V}_{257b} \& \text{LG} = 5 \& \text{V}_{257a}) | (\text{V}_{257d} \& \text{V}_{257a} \& \text{MS} = 5); \]

### Tradeoffs
- Our approach was slower than the Heimdahl & Leveson approach
  - BDD-based, but not model checking
- Their approach reported some false positives

### Function consistency
- Many functions are defined in terms of cases
- A function is inconsistent if two different conditions \( C_i \) and \( C_j \) are true simultaneously

### Display_Model_Goal
- Tells pilot desired rate of altitude change
- Checking for consistency gave a counterexample
  - Other Aircraft: reverse from an Increase-Climb to an Increase-Descent advisory
  - After study, this is only permitted in our non-deterministic modeling of Other Aircraft
  - Modeling a piece of Other Aircraft’s logic precludes this counterexample

### Output agreement
- Related outputs should be consistent
  - Resolution advisory
    - Increase-Climb, Climb, Descend, Increase-Descent
  - Display_Model_Goal
    - Desired rate of altitude change
    - Between -3000 ft/min and 3000 ft/min
  - Presumably, on a climb advisory, \( \text{Display_Model_Goal} \) should be positive
Output agreement check

- AG (RA = Climb -> DMG > 0)
  - If Resolution Advisory is Climb, then Display_Model_Goal is positive
- Counterexample was found
  - t_1 : RA = Descend, DMG = -1500
  - t_2 : RA = Increase.Descend, DMG = -2500
  - t_3 : RA = Climb, DMG = -1500

Limitations

- Can’t model all of TCAS
  - Pushing limits of SMV (more than 200 bit variables is problematic)
  - Need some non-linear arithmetic to model parts of Other.Aircraft
    - New result that represents constraints as BDD variables and uses a constraint solver
- How to pick appropriate formulae to check?

Where may formulae come from?

“There have been two pilot reports received which indicated that TCAS had issued Descend RA’s at approximately 500 feet AGL even though TCAS is designed to inhibit Descent RAs at 1,000 feet AGL. All available data from these encounters are being reviewed to determine the reason for these RAs.”

--TCAS Web site

More criteria

- Timing criteria
- Data validity criteria
- Degradation criteria
- Feedback criteria
- Reachability criteria

What about infinite state specs?

- Model checking does not apply to infinite state specifications
  - The iterative algorithm will not reach a fixpoint
- Theorem proving applies well to infinite state specifications, but has generally proved to be unsatisfactory in practice
- One approach is to abstract infinite state specifications into finite state ones
  - Doing this and preserving properties is hard
A middle ground

- Jackson and Damon have found an interesting middle ground
- Write infinite state specs (in the style of Z)
- Use “model checking” on all instances of the specifications up to a certain size
  - Report counterexamples, if found
  - Success doesn’t guarantee that the properties hold in the specification (beyond the checked sizes)

Nitpick

- The tool that checks for counterexamples given a (subset of) Z specification
- Examples include
  - Paragraph style mechanisms
  - Telephone switch structures (like the one from Mataga and Zave)
- Two variants—explicit state space enumeration and BDD-based checking

Paragraph style mechanisms

- Hierarchical definition of styles
- Questions about inheritance structures
  - Inferred or declared?
  - What happens when the relationship between styles changes?

Adding formats

- Now add formats to the specification
  - Formatting can override pieces of style
- What are the consequences?
  - Formatting accidentally dropped
  - ...

Explicit vs. symbolic

- The explicit counterexample checker identifies isomorphs, does short-circuit enumeration, etc.
- The symbolic counterexample checker translates the relational descriptions into boolean structures and then uses BDDs
- The BDD-based has less consistent behavior, but is sometimes much faster

Iteration

- Improve confidence in a specification by iterative checking of a different “view” of the specification
  - People using model checkers are usually unhappy when the original answer is “yes”
  - The iterative process of poking at the specification, changing the formulae, etc., contribute to an increased confidence that is not necessarily measurable