



Maximum weight matching

Bipartite graphs very useful for modeling:

- jobs & machines
- employers, employees
- men women



Matching: set of edges with no common endpoints



Total weight 5


8

5

Often 3 weights on edges

and we want to find max weighted

matching



Ascending auction alg. for integer weights for max matching

Fix bid increment $\delta = \frac{1}{n+1}$

$\vec{p} = (p_1, \dots, p_n)$ p_j price of item j

Initially all $p_j = 0$ and matching empty
 $M(i) = \emptyset \forall i$

As long as matching not perfect


one unmatched bidder i

bids on some j in

$$D_i(\vec{p}) = \{j \mid v_{ij} - p_j \geq v_{ik} - p_k \text{ and } v_{ij} \geq p_j\}$$

demand set.

and bids $p_j + \delta$ on it.



If j unmatched, then $M(i) := j$

else, say $M(k) = j$,

remove (k, j) from matching
and add (i, j) [i.e. $M(i) := j$]

Theorem

Suppose v_{ij} integer. The "auction algorithm" terminates with a max wt matching and the final prices are almost "envy-free"

$$M(i)=j \Rightarrow v_{ij} - p_j \geq v_{ik} - p_k - \delta \quad \forall k \quad (*)$$

Proof

- from moment item is matched, it stays matched forever

- until item is matched, $p_j = 0$

\Rightarrow if i unmatched, $D_i(\vec{p}) \neq \emptyset$

Every step till termination $\Delta(\sum p_j) = \delta$

$p_k \leq \max_{i,j} v_{ij} + \delta \Rightarrow$ alg terminates

\Rightarrow matching perfect.

(*) \checkmark

Let M^* be any other matching, M final matching output

$$\text{by } (*) \quad \sum_i (v_{iM(i)} - p_{M(i)}) \geq \sum_i (v_{iM^*(i)} - p_{M^*(i)} - \delta)$$

$$\Rightarrow \sum_i v_{iM(i)} \geq \sum_i v_{iM^*(i)} - n\delta = \sum_i v_{iM^*(i)} - \frac{n}{n+1}$$

since wt of any p.m. is int \Rightarrow

M max wt matching



How many times main loop executed?

$$\leq \frac{n}{\delta} \max_{ij} v_{ij}$$

$\max_{ij} v_{ij} = 1 \Rightarrow O(n^2)$ times.
ie. matching