Finite-State Specifications

• There is a large class of specification languages based on finite state machines
• Often primarily for describing the control aspects of reactive systems
• The theoretical basis is very firm
  - Lots of theory on finite-state machines, plus analysis support from theorem proving and model checking
  - As we’ll see briefly, modeling checking is increasingly feasible for analyzing this kind of specification

Reactive systems

• Essentially event-driven systems that responds to both external (from the environment) and internally-generated stimuli, and also provides stimuli to the external environment
• These are generally embedded systems in which we care about the behavior of the overall system, not the software per se
• As fewer and fewer complex systems are built without software — one can legitimately view this as inappropriate and, in some cases, perhaps even unethical — the pressures on properly specifying (and analyzing) reactive systems increases

Many, many models

• Standard finite state machines
  - Set of states
  - One initial state
  - Zero or more termination states
  - Finite alphabet
  - Transition relation
• Petri nets
• Communicating finite state machines
• Statecharts
• RSML
• ...

A common problem

• It is often the case that conventional finite state machines blow-up in size for big problems
• This is especially true for deterministic machines
  - And these are usually preferable to non-deterministic ones, because they don’t allow implementers to make decisions about the behavior of the specified system
• And for machines capturing concurrency (because of the potential interleavings that must be captured)

State explosion

• The state explosion problem is very similar to the potential blow-up that arises when transforming a non-deterministic finite-state machine to a deterministic one
• There is a potential exponential blowup: an N-state machine can become an $2^N$-state machine
• As a high-level example think
  - of a state machine that tracks the amount of money put into a vending machine and
  - of a state machine that tracks the buttons pushed on the vending machine to indicate which product to purchase
  - if money can be entered and buttons can be pushed in an interleaved fashion, consider the fully expanded single state machine that composes these two sub-machines
Statecharts (Harel)

- A visual formalism for defining finite state machines
- A hierarchical mechanism allows for complex machines to be defined by smaller descriptions
  - Parallel states (AND decomposition)
  - Conventional OR decomposition
- The reduced size of the description is a central piece of the leverage of statecharts

Communicating state machines

- In conventional state machines, precisely one state must be occupied at a given time
- In communicating state machines (including statecharts), every machine in a composition must occupy one state at a given time
  - This allows (in part) the blow-up of representation to be mitigated, because now a pair of communicating state machines can represent $N \times M$ states in the overall machine using $N + M$ states

Hierarchical state machines

- Harel’s additional insight was to allow the hierarchical definition of state machines
  - It’s basically an and-or tree of state machines
  - Machines separated by dotted lines are “and” machines, where each of the machines occupies exactly one state at a time; it’s easy to imagine taking the cross product to create a flattened machine
  - Everything else is an “or” machine, essentially like a standard state machine (although they can in turn be nested “and” machines)

Tons of details

- As you noted in the paper, there are many details
- What are the start states upon entering an “and” machine?
  - These notations usually have an arrow with nothing at the tail pointing at the start states.
- What happens upon exits from a nested state?
  - Nested states are allowed to cause exits from the enclosing “and” machines (usually by showing a transition to the edge of the enclosed box)
- And more, more, more!

An RSML example

- The following slide shows a very rough “statechart” from RSML
  - RSML is a variant of statecharts developed specifically for the specification of TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System)
  - I will call all descriptions in these similar languages “statecharts”
- Three high-level states: on, off, and panic
- The on state is expanded and has three parallel states: temperature, rod movement, and rod configuration
- The only non-traditional statecharts feature in this description is the temperature state, which uses a bus that connects all substates (too hot, hot, okay, cold) to one another
- There are six events listed at the bottom (this is an incomplete list)
  - Each event has a name, a description of how it is generated (externally or by a specific sub-machine in the description), and a list of the sub-machines that react to that event
Sample transitions

- This slide shows three sample transitions
- Conditions on the transitions are common
- Output actions are also listed here

Events

- External—interactions with environment
- Synchrony hypothesis (from Esterel)
  - External event arrives
  - Triggers cascade of internal events (micro steps)
  - Stability reached before next external event
- RSML requires the synchrony hypothesis
- Statecharts gives a choice

Synchrony hypothesis

- Accept a single external event and then propagate all internal events until the machine stabilizes, and then accept another external event, etc.
- One model of this is to think of the machine as executing infinitely fast
- The alternative is to allow external and internal events to interleave
- The latter alternative appears to be used in hardware specifications more frequently, and the former in software specifications (so we will consider the synchrony hypothesis as a rule)

Semantics

- What to do when there are multiple events available: which of the enabled transitions should be taken?
- There are literally dozens (published) choices, with subtle distinctions
- Some of the more theoretically pleasing semantics seem, unfortunately, to be less intuitive to people
- It is, however, critical to have a well-defined semantics; after all, these are specification languages
  - The most common semantics are the “Statemate semantics”, Harel and Naamad, which define the formal semantics of statecharts in terms of the operational semantics defined by the Statemate tool
  - At the same time, for most “normal” examples, the differences among the semantics are not significant

Reasoning

- The definition of precise semantics allows reasoning of the meaning of statecharts
- Given an initial state
  - And a set of possible external events
  - What states can be reached?
- Again, not that different from program correctness, model-based specifications, or algebraic specifications: reason inductively
Differences

• But state-based specifications are fundamentally different from model-based and algebraic specifications
• More importantly, a central focus on specifying control (as opposed to state, or pseudo-state as in algebraic specifications)
• The computations represented at specific nodes (states) in statecharts are generally not part of the basic specification and reasoning
  – But they are, of course, important
  – And they are addressed by some notations and tools

Question

• So we have a big statecharts-like specification
• How do we know it has properties we want it to have?
  – Ex: is it deterministic?
  – Ex: can you ever have the doors unlock by themselves while the car is moving?
  – Ex: can you ever cause an emergency descent when you are under 500 feet above ground level?

Standard answers include

• Human inspection
• Simulation
• Analysis

• Aside: especially for safety-critical systems, I cannot imagine using only a single approach

An alternative: model checking

• Evaluate temporal properties of finite state systems
  – Guarantee a property is true or return a counterexample
  – Ex: Is it true that we can never enter an error state?
  – Ex: Are we able to handle a reset from any state?
• Extremely successfully for hardware verification
  – Intel got into the game after the FDIV error
• Open question: applicable to software specifications?

State Transition Graph

• One way to represent a finite state machine is as a state transition graph
  – S is a finite set of states
  – R is a binary relation that defines the possible transitions between states in S
  – P is a function that assigns atomic propositions to each state in S
    – e.g., that a specific process holds a lock
• Other representations include regular expressions, etc.

Example

• Three states
• Transitions as shown
• Atomic properties a, b and c
• Given a start state (say, S0), you can consider legal paths through the state machine
A computation tree

• From a given start state, you can represent all possible paths with an infinite computation tree
• Model checking allows us to answer questions about this tree structure
• Because the underlying machine is finite-state, the structure of the computation tree is constrained

Temporal formulae: we can say things like

• Does some property hold true globally (e.g., in every state)?
  – Top figure
• Does some property inevitably hold true (e.g., along every path)?
  – Bottom figure
• Does some property potentially hold true?

Mutual exclusion example

• N1 and N2, non-critical regions of Process 1 and 2
• T1 and T2, trying regions
• C1 and C2, critical regions
• AF(C1) in lightly shaded state?
  – C1 always inevitably true?
• EF(C1 AND C2) in dark shaded state?
  – C1 and C2 eventually true?

How does model checking work? (in brief!)

• An iterative algorithm that labels states in the transition graph with formulae known to be true
• For a query Q
  – the first iteration marks all subformulae of Q of length 1
  – the second iteration marks them of length 2
  – this terminates since the formula is finite
• The details of the logic indeed matter
  – But not at this level of description

Example

• Q == T1 implies AF C1
  – If Process 1 is trying to acquire the mutex, then it is inevitably true it will get it sometime
• Q == (not T) OR AF C1
  – Rewriting with DeMorgan’s Laws
• First, label all the states where T1, not T1, and C1 are true
  – These are atomic properties

Example

• Next mark all the states in which AF C1 is true, etc.
  – The algorithm tracks states visited using depth-first search
  – Slight variations for AF, AG, EF, EG, etc.
• At termination, (not T1) OR AF C1 is true everywhere
  – Hence the temporal property is true for the state machine
Symbolic model checking

- State space can be huge (> $2^{1000}$) for many systems
- Key idea: use implicit representation of state space
  - Data structure to represent transition relation as a boolean formula
- Algorithmically manipulate the data structure to explore the state space
- Key: efficiency of the data structure

Binary decision diagrams (BDDs)

- “Folded decision tree”
- Fixed variable order
- Many functions have small BDDs
  - Multiplication is a notable exception
- Can represent
  - State machines (transition functions) and
  - Temporal queries

BDD-based model checking

- Iterative, fixed-point algorithms that are quite similar to those in explicit model checking
- Applying boolean functions to BDDs is efficient, which makes the underlying algorithms efficient
  - AND becomes set intersection, OR becomes set union, etc.
- When the BDDs remain small, that is
  - The ordering of the variables is a key issue

BDD-based successes in HW

- IEEE Futurebus+ cache coherence protocol
- Control protocol for Philips stereo components
- ISDN User Part Protocol
- ...

Software model checking

- Finite state software specifications
  - Reactive systems (avionics, automotive, etc.)
  - Hierarchical state machine specifications
- Not intended to help with proving consistency of specification and implementation
  - Rather, checking properties of the specification itself

Why might it fail?

- Software is often specified with infinite state descriptions
- Software specifications may be structured differently from hardware specifications
  - Hierarchy
  - Representations and algorithms for model checking may not scale
Our approach at UW—try it!

- Applied model checking to the specification of TCAS II
  - Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
  - In use on U.S. commercial aircraft
  - [http://www.faa.gov/and/and600/and620/newtcas.htm](http://www.faa.gov/and/and600/and620/newtcas.htm)
  - FAA adopted specification
  - Initial design and development by Leveson et al.
- Later applied it to a statecharts description of an electrical power distribution system model of the B777
  - The vast bulk of this work was due to William Chan
    - Along with Mike Ernst won honorable mention in the 2000 ACM Dissertation Award competition
    - Died in a tragic automobile accident a week after defending his dissertation

TCAS

- Warn pilots of traffic
  - Plane to plane, not through ground controller
  - On essentially all commercial aircraft
- Issue resolution advisories only
  - Vertical resolution only
  - Relies on transponder data

TCAS specification

- Irvine Safety Group (Leveson et al.)
  - Specified in RSML as a research project
  - FAA adopted RSML version as official
- Specification is about 400 pages long
- This study uses: Version 6.00, March 1993
  - Not the current FAA version

Using SMV

- SMV is a BDD-based model checker
- It checks CTL formulas
  - A specific temporal logic
- We developed reasonably efficient techniques for mapping RSML to SMV, including the state hierarchies

Iterative process

- Iterate SMV version of specification
- Clarify and refine temporal formula
- Model environment more precisely
- Refine specification
Use of non-determinism: needed to reduce size of the BDDs

- Inputs from environment
  - Altitude := {1000...8000}

- Simplification of functions
  - Alt_Rate := \( 0.25 \times (\text{Alt}_\text{Baro} - 2\text{P}) / \Delta \text{t} \)
  - Alt_Rate := \{-2000...2000\}

- Unmodelled parts of specification
  - States of Other_Aircraft treated as non-deterministic input variables

Checking properties

- Initial attempts to check any property generated BDDs of over 200MB
- First successful check took 13 hours
  - Was reduced to a few minutes

- Techniques included
  - Partitioned BDDs
  - Reordered variables
  - Implemented better search for counterexamples

Property checking

- Domain independent properties
  - Deterministic state transitions
  - Function consistency

- Domain dependent
  - Output agreement
  - Safety properties

- We used SMV to investigate some of these properties on TCAS' Own_Aircraft module

Deterministic transitions

- Do the same conditions allow for non-deterministic transitions?
- Inconsistencies were found earlier (in an earlier version of TCAS) by other methods [Heimdahl and Leveson]
  - Identical conditions allowed transitions from Sensitivity Level 4 to SL 2 or to SL 5
- Our formulae checked for all possible non-determinism; we found this case, too

Function consistency

- Many functions are defined in terms of cases
  - If C1 is true then F returns V1
  - If C2 is true then F returns V2
  - If C3 is true then F returns V3

- A function is inconsistent if two different conditions C1 and C2 can be true simultaneously

- So, check the formula (for three cases)
  - \( AG \neg ((C1 \land C2) \lor (C1 \land C3) \lor (C2 \land C3)) \)
Display_Model_Goal

- Tells pilot desired rate of altitude change
- Checking for consistency gave a counterexample
  - Other_Aircraft reverse from an Increase-Climb to an Increase-Descend advisory
  - After study, this is only permitted in our non-deterministic modeling of Other_Aircraft
  - Modeling a piece of Other_Aircraft’s logic precludes this counterexample

Output agreement check

- AG ((RA = Climb) implies (DMG > 0))
  - If Resolution Advisory is Climb, then Display_Model_Goal is positive
- Counterexample was found
  - t₀ : RA = Descend, DMG = -1500
  - t₁ : RA = Increase-Descend, DMG = -2500
  - t₂ : RA = Climb, DMG = -1500

Limitations

- Can’t model all of TCAS
  - Pushing limits of SMV (more than 200 bit variables is problematic)
  - Need some non-linear arithmetic to model parts of Other_Aircraft
    - New result that represents constraints as BDD variables and uses a constraint solver
- How to pick appropriate formulae to check?

Whence formulae?

- “There have been two pilot reports received which indicated that TCAS had issued Descend RA’s at approximately 500 feet AGL even though TCAS is designed to inhibit Descent RAs at 1,000 feet AGL. All available data from these encounters are being reviewed to determine the reason for these RAs.” - TCAS web
Whence formulae?

- Jaffe, Leveson et al. developed criteria that specifications of embedded real-time systems should satisfy, including:
  - All information from sensors should be used
  - Behavior before startup, after shutdown and during off-line processing should be specified
  - Every state must have a transition defined for every possible input (including timeouts)
    - Predicates on the transitions must yield deterministic behavior
  - Essentially a check-list, but a very useful one

What about infinite state?

- Model checking does not apply to infinite state specifications
  - The iterative algorithm will not reach a fixpoint
- Theorem proving applies well to infinite state specifications, but has generally proved to be unsatisfactory in practice
- One approach is to abstract infinite state specifications into finite state ones
  - Doing this while preserving properties is hard
- D. Jackson et al.’s Nitpick approach
  - Find counterexamples (errors), but don’t “prove” anything

Model checking wrap up

- The goal of model checking is to allow finite state descriptions to be analyzed and shown to have particular desirable properties
  - Won’t help when you don’t want or need finite state descriptions
  - Definitely added value when you do, but it’s not turnkey yet
    - There’s still a real art in managing model checking
    - Definitely feasible on modest sized systems
- This was fast: my goal wasn’t to make you into model checking experts
  - But it might titillate one or two of you to learn more
- But rather to understand the sketches of what model checking is and why it is so promising for checking some classes of specifications