

CSE 484: Computer Security and Privacy

Root Cause Analysis and Patching

Spring 2024

David Kohlbrenner

dkohlbre@cs

Thanks to Franz Roesner, Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, David Kohlbrenner, Yoshi Kohno, Ada Lerner, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

Logistics

- Homework 3: Due Wednesday
- Final project:
 - Root cause analysis and patching 😊
 - Out now (part A)
 - **No late days on part C, recommend no late days on part B**

Root-Cause Analysis (RCA)

- Suppose you work on the security team at a company
- You receive a report of a vulnerability in the wild, including a working proof-of-concept exploit
- What do you do now?

Root-Cause Analysis (RCA)

- Basically debugging, but you didn't generate the input
- Consider:
 - What is different between a “normal” interaction and the exploit?
 - What part(s) of the program are relevant to that interaction
 - Add logging/debugging here! But consider that it might affect the exploit...
 - What specifically happened that was “unusual”?
 - Develop theories about what is happening
 - Test your theories!

The Goals for RCAs

- Identify what the exploit accomplishes
- Identify the major steps the exploit takes
- Find the specific code components (if any exist) that are responsible
 - Aka: the vulnerability
 - Consider that an exploit might leverage *missing* features!
- Find “nearby” bugs
 - i.e., if you fix the most-responsible line of code, is it still vulnerable?
- Plan out a patch

Project 0 (p0) RCAs

- Google Project Zero (aka p0) is the premiere publicly-disclosing bug hunting team
- They produce detailed writeups of many bugs, and work with Google's Threat Analysis Group (aka TAG) to produce RCAs of in-the-wild bugs.
- You should go read some p0 RCAs!
<https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/rca.html>

Sample RCA

CVE-2021-26411: Internet Explorer MSHTML Double-Free

Maddie Stone

The Basics

Disclosure or Patch Date: 9 March 2021

Product: Microsoft Internet Explorer

Advisory: <https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26411>

Affected Versions: [KB4601319](#) and previous

First Patched Version: [KB5000802](#)

Issue/Bug Report: N/A

Patch CL: N/A

Bug-Introducing CL: N/A

Reporter(s): yangkang(@dnpushme) & huangyi(@C0rk1_H) & Enki

Sample RCA

The Code

Proof-of-concept:

```
<!-- saved from url=(0014)about:internet -->
<script>

String.prototype.repeat = function (size) { return new Array(size + 1).join(this); }

var ele = document.createElement('element')
var attr1 = document.createAttribute('attribute')
attr1.nodeValue = {
  valueOf: function() {
    alert('callback')
    alert(ele.attributes.length)
    ele.clearAttributes()
    alert(ele.attributes.length)
  }
}

ele.setAttributeNode(attr1)
ele.setAttribute('attr2', 'AAAAAAA')
ele.removeAttributeNode(attr1)

</script>
```

Exploit sample: https://enki.co.kr/blog/2021/02/04/ie_0day.html

Did you have access to the exploit sample when doing the analysis? Yes

Sample RCA

The Vulnerability

Bug class: Use-after-free

Vulnerability details:

A value of an attribute is able to be freed twice.

When calling `removeAttributeNode`, `mshtml!CElement::ie9_removeAttributeNodeInternal` is called. `ie9_removeAttributeNodeInternal` first finds the 2 indices for the node entry in the attribute array for the element. (Attribute nodes have 2 entries in the attribute array whereas non-node attributes only have one.) The use-after-free occurs because there is a user-controlled callback between the calculating the indices and when they are used. The backing store buffer can be changed during this callback and the code doesn't verify that the index is still valid.

In the case of the above crash POC, the backing store buffer of the array is cleared using `clearAttributes` in the callback. `mshtml!CElement::clearAttributes` clears the attributes backing array by deleting/freeing the first element in the array and memmoving the following entries into that space. This means that when `clearAttributes` is finished and the code path returns to `removeAttributeNodeInternal`, we have now filled the freed space with whatever attribute was at the end of the attribute array and that attribute has also been freed. This can be a pointer to the user-controlled string object. In this case the "use" is a double free on the String object that holds the value for the second attribute added to the element.

Sample RCA

The Exploit

(The terms *exploit primitive*, *exploit strategy*, *exploit technique*, and *exploit flow* are [defined here](#).)

Exploit strategy (or strategies):

The double free is used to have two objects, one array of Dictionary items and one BSTR, allocated to the same block of memory on the heap. These two objects are able to be allocated to the same spot because a BSTR has the structure of: first 4 bytes is the length and the rest is the string data. The array of dictionary items is a VARIANT struct so it has the type in the first four bytes. The type is (VT_ARRAY | VT_VARIANT) = 0x200C. The BSTR also has a length of 0x200C, making them both valid objects.

The exploit uses this type confusion to leak the addresses of objects stored in the Dictionary by reading the bytes at the equivalent indices in the BSTR. It then uses the Dictionary to read and write to different memory values using a trick described in the "Exploitation, Part 1: From Arbitrary Write to Arbitrary Read" section of [this blog post](#) by Simon Zuckerbraun, including creating an ArrayBuffer whose address begins at 0x00000000 and its length is 0xFFFFFFFF, yielding an arbitrary read-write primitive.

The exploit bypasses Control Flow Guard (CFG) by overwriting the export address table entry in rpctr4.dll for `__guard_check_icall_fptr` with `KiFastSystemCallRet`.

Exploit flow:

Two objects are allocated to the same block of memory thanks to the double free. This is used to first leak the address of objects using the VBAArray objects for dereferencing. Then the exploits overwrites the length and starting address of an ArrayBuffer to have an arbitrary read-write primitive from 0x00000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF.

Sample RCA

The Next Steps

Variant analysis

Areas/approach for variant analysis (and why):

- Audit anywhere that a callback occurs between where an index is calculated and when it's used.
- Fuzz HTML attributes, potentially with a tool like [Domato](#)

Found variants: N/A

Structural improvements

What are structural improvements such as ways to kill the bug class, prevent the introduction of this vulnerability, mitigate the exploit flow, make this type of vulnerability harder to exploit, etc.?

Ideas to kill the bug class:

- Verify the state of the objects being operated on after the callback. In this case it could be simplified to don't use indices that were calculated prior to a callback.
- Internet Explorer is now considered "legacy" software. Removing it from being accessible by default in the Windows operating system would reduce the attack surface.

Ideas to mitigate the exploit flow:

- Remove Internet Explorer from being enabled by default.

Patch Writing Goals

- Break the *specific* exploit strategy the exploit uses
- Break *similar* exploit strategies
 - Consider how XSS filtering worked in Lab 2! (... Not great!)
- Minimize breaking explicit features of the program
- Minimize breaking *implicit* features of the program

Public Bug Finding: Terminology

- “Zero Days” – 0 days (aka “o-days”)
 - Refers to a bug that is made publicly known at the same time as the vendor is told
 - The vendor has had ‘0 days’ of lead time to fix it
- CVE Number
 - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
 - E.g. CVE-2022-4135
- CWE
 - Common Weakness Enumeration
 - Standardized list of bug types
- CVSS
 - Common Vulnerability Scoring System
 - Very limited utility, scores barely correlated with impact

Public Bug Finding: Disclosure

- At some point, the vendor finds out about the bug
 - Either publicly revealed by finder (an 0-day)
 - Internally found by code auditing
 - Found being used in-the-wild
- If *you* find the bug:
 - When do you disclose?
 - How do you disclose?
 - “Full-disclosure” vs “Coordinated disclosure” vs “Responsible disclosure”
- Bug bounty programs offer incentives to disclose
 - But at a cost: you usually have to sign NDAs

Final Project Learning Goals

- Combine lessons/skills from the quarter:
 - Identifying and understanding (and fixing) vulnerabilities
 - Debugging and execution tracing (e.g., with gdb)
 - Software and web security concepts
 - Clear technical communication
- You'll gain experience in:
 - **Root-causing** a security bug similar to ones seen in class
 - **Writing patches** for security bugs similar to ones seen in class
 - **Making sense of a moderate codebase** (~1100 or fewer loc)
- This lab is a more realistic depiction of what working in security industry on the defender side in “real life” might be like

Final Project Components

- Part A
 - We will give you the RCA for an exploit, and **you have to write the patch**
- Part B
 - We will give you an exploit, and **you have to write the RCA**
 - (You can choose one of three exploits. You can do one additional for extra credit.)
- Part C
 - **You have to write the patch** for Part B's exploit

tinyserv – a tiny, bad, HTTP server

- ~1000 lines of C code
- Moderately well commented
- Quite buggy 😊
- You can interact with it via command line tools or a web browser

Major Features

- “admin” login
 - Sets a randomized password on server start
 - Successful login sets a cookie that lets admins access admin.txt
 - admin.txt contains a log of requests received so far
 - (Our exploits work by demonstrating they can access admin.txt)
- Dynamic content fills
 - Some pages have dynamic content (notably 404s) that gets filled at request
- Response caching
 - Pages are cached in a hashtable on first send
 - Future responses will check the hashtable first

How Should You Start?

- To run it, inside target/tinyserv: `./tinyserv ./files`
- In browser (from anywhere), visit:
 - <http://umnak.cs.washington.edu:YOUR-PORT-NUMBER>
 - Find the port number in the `lab3_port` file, and your group's secret in the `lab3_group_secret` file
- (FYI, to minimize risk, the server will kill itself after 3 hours if you leave it running)

Quick Demo

- Notes from demo:
 - “`make`” inside `target/tinyserv` to (re)compile `tinyserv`
 - `curl`: a tool that generates an HTTP request, used in spoils
 - “`./handin.sh`” to create a diff after you’ve created a patch

RCA Strategies

- Read through the server code (see main.c to start)
 - You don't have to understand everything!
- Read through the sploit inputs and try to guess which parts of the tinyserv code might be related; start debugging there!
- Use gdb for debugging and execution tracing
 - `gdb -args ./tinyserv ./files`
 - `break [function name or line number]`
 - `run`
 - From another terminal window, you can now run the spoits
- (Maybe:) Modify main.c to test things out or add print statements

Other Final Project Notes

- There is an additional cookie: the lab group secret key
 - This is NOT part of the lab, it is there to prevent accidentally interacting with other groups' servers
- You also don't need to dig into the socket-related code

Turn-in (Group Submissions)

There are 5 Gradescope assignments:

- **Everyone submits to this one:**
 - Final Project Part A – Sploit1
- **Submit to ONE of these, depending on which sploit you do:**
 - Final Project Part B – Sploit3 Version
 - Final Project Part B – Sploit4 Version
- **Submit to ONE of these, matching your part B:**
 - Final Project Part C – Sploit3 Version
 - Final Project Part C – Sploit4 Version