CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

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Announcements / Answers

• If you’re on the class mailing list, you should have received a test email.
• Late days: everyone in the group uses them simultaneously
• Example final projects: we will post some!
• Prereqs...
Prerequisites (CSE 484)

- **Required:** Data Structures (CSE 326) or Data Abstractions (CSE 332)
- **Required:** Hardware/Software Interface (CSE 351) or Machine Org and Assembly Language (CSE 378)
- **Assume:** Working knowledge of C and assembly
  - One of the labs will involve writing buffer overflow attacks in C
  - You must have detailed understanding of x86 architecture, stack layout, calling conventions, etc.
- **Assume:** Working knowledge of software engineering tools for Unix environments (gdb, etc)
- **Assume:** Working knowledge of Java and JavaScript
Prerequisites (CSE 484)

• Strongly recommended: Computer Networks; Operating Systems
  – Will help provide deeper understanding of security mechanisms and where they fit in the big picture

• Recommended: Complexity Theory; Discrete Math; Algorithms
  – Will help with the more theoretical aspects of this course.
Last Time

• Importance of the security mindset
  – Challenging design assumptions
  – Thinking like an attacker

• There’s no such thing as perfect security
  – But, attackers have limited resources
  – Make them pay unacceptable costs to succeed!

• Defining security per context: identify assets, adversaries, motivations, threats, vulnerabilities, risk, possible defenses
SECURITY GOALS ("CIA")
Confidentiality (Privacy)

- Confidentiality is **concealment of information**.

Eavesdropping, packet sniffing, illegal copying
Integrity

• Integrity is *prevention of unauthorized changes.*
Authenticity

- Authenticity is knowing who you’re talking to.

Unauthorized assumption of another’s identity
Availability

- Availability is **ability to use information or resources.**

Overwhelm or crash servers, disrupt infrastructure

network
THREAT MODELING
What Drives Attackers?

- Money, theft, fun
- Malice, revenge, wreak havoc
- Curiosity, fun
- Politics, terror
Threat Modeling (Security Reviews)

- **Assets**: What are we trying to protect? How valuable are those assets?
- **Adversaries**: Who might try to attack, and why?
- **Vulnerabilities**: How might the system be weak?
- **Threats**: What actions might an adversary take to exploit vulnerabilities?
- **Risk**: How important are assets? How likely is exploit?
- **Possible Defenses**
Example: Electronic Voting

• Popular replacement to traditional paper ballots
**Pre-Election**

Pre-election: Poll workers load “ballot definition files” on voting machine.
Active voting: Voters obtain single-use tokens from poll workers. Voters use tokens to activate machines and vote.
Active Voting

**Active voting**: Votes encrypted and stored. Voter token canceled.
Post-Election

**Post-election**: Stored votes transported to tabulation center.

- **Poll worker**
- **Voter token**
- **Ballot definition file**
- **Interactively vote**
- **Tabulator**
- **Encrypted votes**
- **Recorded votes**
- **Tabulator**
Security and E-Voting (Simplified)

- **Functionality goals:**
  - Easy to use, reduce mistakes/confusion

- **Security goals:**
  - Adversary should not be able to tamper with the election outcome
    - By changing votes (**integrity**)
    - By voting on behalf of someone (**authenticity**)
    - By denying voters the right to vote (**availability**)
  - Adversary should not be able to figure out how voters vote (**confidentiality**)

3/29/17
Can You Spot Any Potential Issues?

Poll worker → Ballot definition file → Interactively vote → Encrypted votes → Recorded votes → Tabulator

- Voter token
- Ballot definition file
- Interactively vote
- Encrypted votes
- Recorded votes
- Tabulator
Potential Adversaries

• Voters
• Election officials
• Employees of voting machine manufacturer
  – Software/hardware engineers
  – Maintenance people
• Other engineers
  – Makers of hardware
  – Makers of underlying software or add-on components
  – Makers of compiler
• ...
• Or any combination of the above
What Software is Running?

Problem: An adversary (e.g., a poll worker, software developer, or company representative) able to control the software or the underlying hardware could do whatever he or she wanted.
KEYS TO THE KINGDOM

Photo taken from Diebold's online store. The keys that open every Diebold touch-screen voting machine. Working copies have been made from the photo.
Problem: Ballot definition files are not authenticated.

Example attack: A malicious poll worker could modify ballot definition files so that votes cast for “Mickey Mouse” are recorded for “Donald Duck.”
Problem: Smartcards can perform cryptographic operations. But there is no authentication from voter token to terminal.

Example attack: A regular voter could make his or her own voter token and vote multiple times.
Problem: Encryption key ("F2654hD4") hard-coded into the software since (at least) 1998. Votes stored in the order cast.

Example attack: A poll worker could determine how voters vote.
**Problem:** When votes transmitted to tabulator over the Internet or a dialup connection, they are **decrypted first**; the cleartext results are sent to the tabulator.

**Example attack:** A sophisticated outsider could determine how voters vote.
TOWARDS DEFENSES
Approaches to Security

• Prevention
  – Stop an attack

• Detection
  – Detect an ongoing or past attack

• Response
  – Respond to attacks

• The threat of a response may be enough to deter some attackers
Whole System is Critical

- Securing a system involves a whole-system view
  - Cryptography
  - Implementation
  - People
  - Physical security
  - Everything in between

- This is because “security is only as strong as the weakest link,” and security can fail in many places
  - No reason to attack the strongest part of a system if you can walk right around it.
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Attacker’s Asymmetric Advantage
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• Attacker only needs to win in one place
• Defender’s response: Defense in depth
From Policy to Implementation

• After you’ve figured out what security means to your application, there are still challenges:
  – Requirements bugs
    • Incorrect or problematic goals
  – Design bugs
    • Poor use of cryptography
    • Poor sources of randomness
    • ...
  – Implementation bugs
    • Buffer overflow attacks
    • ...
  – Is the system usable?

Don’t forget the users! They are a critical component!
Many Participants

• Many parties involved
  – System developers
  – Companies deploying the system
  – The end users
  – The adversaries (possibly one of the above)

• Different parties have different goals
  – System developers and companies may wish to optimize cost
  – End users may desire security, privacy, and usability
  – But the relationship between these goals is quite complex (will customers choose not to buy the product if it is not secure?)
Better News

• There are a lot of defense mechanisms
  – We’ll study some, but by no means all, in this course

• It’s important to understand their limitations
  – “If you think cryptography will solve your problem, then you don’t understand cryptography... and you don’t understand your problem” -- Bruce Schneier