CSE 484 / CSE M 584: Computer Security and Privacy

Software Security: Miscellaneous

Spring 2016

Franziska (Franzi) Roesner
franzi@cs.washington.edu

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, Dan Halperin, Yoshi Kohno, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...
Looking Forward

- **Today:** more on software security
- **Friday:** guest lecture by David Aucsmith
- **Next week:** finish software security, start crypto

- **Ethics form** due TODAY!
- **Homework #1** due Friday
- **Lab #1** out TODAY
  - Submit your group + public key to the form sent out via email
  - Instructions for creating a key are in the lab description

- **Section this week:** Lab 1
Return-Oriented Programming
Run-Time Checking: StackGuard

- Embed “canaries” (stack cookies) in stack frames and verify their integrity prior to function return
  - Any overflow of local variables will damage the canary
Run-Time Checking: StackGuard

- Embed "canaries" (stack cookies) in stack frames and verify their integrity prior to function return
  - Any overflow of local variables will damage the canary

- Choose random canary string on program start
  - Attacker can’t guess what the value of canary will be

- Terminator canary: "\0", newline, linefeed, EOF
  - String functions like strcpy won’t copy beyond "\0"
StackGuard Implementation

• StackGuard requires code recompilation
• Checking canary integrity prior to every function return causes a performance penalty
  – For example, 8% for Apache Web server
• StackGuard can be defeated
  – A single memory write where the attacker controls both the value and the destination is sufficient
Defeating StackGuard

- Suppose program contains `strcpy(dst,buf)` where attacker controls both dst and buf
  - Example: dst is a local pointer variable

![Diagram showing the concept of defeating StackGuard](image)

- Overwrite destination of `strcpy` with RET position
- `strcpy` will copy BadPointer here
- `BadPointer, attack code` is placed at the RET address
- Return execution to this address
PointGuard

• Attack: overflow a function pointer so that it points to attack code

• Idea: encrypt all pointers while in memory
  – Generate a random key when program is executed
  – Each pointer is XORed with this key when loaded from memory to registers or stored back into memory
    • Pointers cannot be overflowed while in registers

• Attacker cannot predict the target program’s key
  – Even if pointer is overwritten, after XORing with key it will dereference to a “random” memory address
Normal Pointer Dereference

1. Fetch pointer value

2. Access data referenced by pointer

Memory

CPU

1. Fetch pointer value

2. Access attack code referenced by corrupted pointer

Memory

CPU

Pointer
0x1234

Data

0x1234

Corrupted pointer
0x1234

0x1340

CPU

Attack code

0x1340

0x1234

[Cowan]
PointGuard Dereference

1. Fetch pointer value

2. Access data referenced by pointer

Decrypt

Memory

Encrypted pointer
0x7239

Data
0x1234

CPU

0x1234

0x1340

Attack code
0x9786

Corrupted pointer
0x7239
0x1340

CPU

Decrypt

0x9786

Decrypts to random value

1. Fetch pointer value

2. Access random address; segmentation fault and crash
PointGuard Issues

• Must be very fast
  – Pointer dereferences are very common

• Compiler issues
  – Must encrypt and decrypt only pointers
  – If compiler “spills” registers, unencrypted pointer values end up in memory and can be overwritten there

• Attacker should not be able to modify the key
  – Store key in its own non-writable memory page

• PG’d code doesn’t mix well with normal code
  – What if PG’d code needs to pass a pointer to OS kernel?
ASLR: Address Space Randomization

• Map shared libraries to a random location in process memory
  – Attacker does not know addresses of executable code

• Deployment (examples)
  – Windows Vista: 8 bits of randomness for DLLs
  – Linux (via PaX): 16 bits of randomness for libraries
  – Even Android
  – More effective on 64-bit architectures

• Other randomization methods
  – Randomize system call ids or instruction set
Example: ASLR in Vista

• Booting Vista twice loads libraries into different locations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Library</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ntlanman.dll</td>
<td>0x6D7F0000</td>
<td>Microsoft® Lan Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x75370000</td>
<td>Windows NT MARTA provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x6F2C0000</td>
<td>Shell extensions for sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x76160000</td>
<td>Microsoft OLE for Windows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Library</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ntlanman.dll</td>
<td>0x6DA90000</td>
<td>Microsoft® Lan Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x75660000</td>
<td>Windows NT MARTA provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x6D9D0000</td>
<td>Shell extensions for sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0x763C0000</td>
<td>Microsoft OLE for Windows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ASLR Issues

• NOP slides and heap spraying to increase likelihood for custom code (e.g. on heap)

• Brute force attacks or memory disclosures to map out memory on the fly
  – Disclosing a single address can reveal the location of all code within a library
Other Possible Solutions

• Use safe programming languages, e.g., Java
  – What about legacy C code?
  – (Note that Java is not the complete solution)
• Static analysis of source code to find overflows
• Dynamic testing: “fuzzing”
• LibSafe: dynamically loaded library that intercepts calls to unsafe C functions and checks that there’s enough space before doing copies
  – Also doesn’t prevent everything
Beyond Buffer Overflows...
Another Type of Vulnerability

• Consider this code:

```c
int openfile(char *path) {
    struct stat s;
    if (stat(path, &s) < 0)
        return -1;
    if (!S_ISREG(s.st_mode)) {
        error("only allowed to regular files!");
        return -1;
    }
    return open(path, O_RDONLY);
}
```

• **Goal:** Open only regular files (not symlink, etc)
• **What can go wrong?**
TOCTOU (Race Condition)

- TOCTOU == Time of Check to Time of Use:

```c
int openfile(char *path) {
    struct stat s;
    if (stat(path, &s) < 0)
        return -1;
    if (!S_ISRREG(s.st_mode)) {
        error("only allowed to regular files!");
        return -1;
    }
    return open(path, O_RDONLY);
}
```

- **Goal**: Open only regular files (not symlink, etc)
- **Attacker** can change meaning of *path* between *stat* and *open* (and access files he or she shouldn’t)
Another Type of Vulnerability

• Consider this code:

```c
char buf[80];
void vulnerable() {
    int len = read_int_from_network();
    char *p = read_string_from_network();
    if (len > sizeof buf) {
        error("length too large, nice try!");
        return;
    }
    memcpy(buf, p, len);
}
```

```c
void *memcpy(void *dst, const void * src, size_t n);
typedef unsigned int size_t;
```
Integer Overflow and Implicit Cast

• Consider this code:

```c
char buf[80];
void vulnerable() {
    int len = read_int_from_network();
    char *p = read_string_from_network();
    if (len > sizeof buf) {
        error("length too large, nice try!");
        return;
    }
    memcpy(buf, p, len);
}
```

If `len` is negative, may copy huge amounts of input into `buf`.

```c
void *memcpy(void *dst, const void * src, size_t n);
typedef unsigned int size_t;
```
Another Example

```c
size_t len = read_int_from_network();
char *buf;
buf = malloc(len+5);
read(fd, buf, len);
```

(from www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu—implflaws.pdf)
Integer Overflow and Implicit Cast

```c
size_t len = read_int_from_network();
char *buf;
buf = malloc(len+5);
read(fd, buf, len);
```

• What if `len` is large (e.g., `len = 0xFFFFFFFF`)?
• Then `len + 5 = 4` (on many platforms)
• Result: Allocate a 4-byte buffer, then read a lot of data into that buffer.

(from www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu—implflaws.pdf)
Password Checker

• Functional requirements
  – PwdCheck(RealPwd, CandidatePwd) should:
    • Return TRUE if RealPwd matches CandidatePwd
    • Return FALSE otherwise
  – RealPwd and CandidatePwd are both 8 characters long

• Implementation (like TENEX system)

```
PwdCheck(RealPwd, CandidatePwd)  // both 8 chars
for i = 1 to 8 do
  if (RealPwd[i] != CandidatePwd[i]) then
    return FALSE
return TRUE
```

• Clearly meets functional description
Attacker Model

```plaintext
PwdCheck(RealPwd, CandidatePwd) // both 8 chars
for i = 1 to 8 do
    if (RealPwd[i] != CandidatePwd[i]) then
        return FALSE
return TRUE
```

- Attacker can guess *CandidatePwds* through some standard interface
- Naive: Try all $256^8 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616$ possibilities
- Better: Time how long it takes to reject a CandidatePasswd. Then try all possibilities for first character, then second, then third, ....
  - Total tries: $256^8 = 2048$
Timing Attacks

- Assume there are no “typical” bugs in the software
  - No buffer overflow bugs
  - No format string vulnerabilities
  - Good choice of randomness
  - Good design
- The software may still be vulnerable to timing attacks
  - Software exhibits input-dependent timings
- Complex and hard to fully protect against
Other Examples

• Plenty of other examples of timings attacks
  – AES cache misses
    • AES is the “Advanced Encryption Standard”
    • It is used in SSH, SSL, IPsec, PGP, ...
  – RSA exponentiation time
    • RSA is a famous public-key encryption scheme
    • It’s also used in many cryptographic protocols and products
Randomness Issues

- Many applications (especially security ones) require randomness
- Explicit uses:
  - Generate secret cryptographic keys
  - Generate random initialization vectors for encryption
- Other “non-obvious” uses:
  - Generate passwords for new users
  - Shuffle the order of votes (in an electronic voting machine)
  - Shuffle cards (for an online gambling site)
C’s rand() Function

• C has a built-in random function: `rand()`

  ```c
  unsigned long int next = 1;
  /* rand:  return pseudo-random integer on 0..32767 */
  int rand(void) {
    next = next * 1103515245 + 12345;
    return (unsigned int)(next/65536) % 32768;
  }
  /* srand:  set seed for rand() */
  void srand(unsigned int seed) {
    next = seed;
  }
  
  • Problem: don’t use `rand()` for security-critical applications!
    – Given a few sample outputs, you can predict subsequent ones
Problems in Practice

• One institution used (something like) rand() to generate passwords for new users
  – Given your password, you could predict the passwords of other users

• Kerberos (1988 - 1996)
  – Random number generator improperly seeded
  – Possible to trivially break into machines that rely upon Kerberos for authentication

• Online gambling websites
  – Random numbers to shuffle cards
  – Real money at stake
  – But what if poor choice of random numbers?
mamajoe: Hey guys, Big B is in!
More details: “How We Learned to Cheat at Online Poker: A Study in Software Security”
mamajoe: Hey guys, Big B is in!
PS3 and Randomness

Hackers obtain PS3 private cryptography key due to epic programming fail? (update)


• 2010/2011: Hackers found/released private root key for Sony’s PS3
• Key used to sign software – now can load any software on PS3 and it will execute as “trusted”
• Due to bad random number: same “random” value used to sign all system updates
PS3 and Randomness

• Example Current Event report from a past iteration of 484
  – https://catalyst.uw.edu/gopost/conversation/kohno/452868
PS3 Exploit
Today, January 3rd, George “Geohot” Hotz found and released the private root key for Sony’s Playstation 3 (PS3) video game console (http://www.geohot.com/). What this means is that homebrew software enthusiasts, scientists, and software pirates can now load arbitrary software on the PS3 and sign it using this key, and the system will execute it as trusted code. Legitimately, this allows Linux and other operating systems to take advantage of the PS3’s cell processor architecture; however, it also opens up avenues of software piracy previously impossible on Sony’s system without requiring any hardware modifications to the system (previous access of this kind required a USB hardware dongle).

How it Was Done
This was enabled by a cryptographic error by Sony developers in their update process. In the DSA signature algorithm, a number k is chosen from a supposedly random source for each signed message. So long as the numbers are unique, the system is secure, but duplicating a random number between messages can expose the private key to an untrusted party using simple mathematics (http://rdist.root.org/2010/11/19/dsa-requirements-for-random-k-value/). Sony used the exact same “random value” k for all updates pushed to the system, making the signature scheme worthless.

The Most Secure
After Sony removed the “other OS” functionality of the PS3, greater scrutiny was placed on the PS3. Since it’s release in 2006, the Playstation 3 was considered the most secure of the three major video game consoles, as it was the only console without a “root” compromise in the four years since release (there were vulnerabilities limited to specific firmware or that required specialized hardware, but nothing that provided unfettered access). By comparison, Microsoft’s Xbox 360 was cracked over 4 years ago (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/03/01/xbox_hack), and the Wii was cracked over 2 years ago (http://wiibrew.org/wiki/Index.php).

Cullen Walsh
Mark Jordan
Peter Lipay
Other Problems

• Key generation
  – Ubuntu removed the randomness from SSL, creating vulnerable keys for thousands of users/servers
  – Undetected for 2 years (2006-2008)

• Live CDs, diskless clients
  – May boot up in same state every time

• Virtual Machines
  – Save state: Opportunity for attacker to inspect the pseudorandom number generator’s state
  – Restart: May use same “psuedorandom” value more than once
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4;  // chosen by fair dice roll.
    // guaranteed to be random.
}

https://xkcd.com/221/
Obtaining Pseudorandom Numbers

• For security applications, want “cryptographically secure pseudorandom numbers”
• Libraries include cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators
• Linux:
  – /dev/random
  – /dev/urandom - nonblocking, possibly less entropy
• Internally:
  – Entropy pool gathered from multiple sources
Where do (good) random numbers come from?

- **Humans:** keyboard, mouse input
- **Timing:** interrupt firing, arrival of packets on the network interface
- **Physical processes:** unpredictable physical phenomena