PACEMAKERS AND IMPLANTABLE CARDIAC DEFIBRILLATORS: SOFTWARE RADIO ATTACKS AND ZERO-POWER DEFENSES

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MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

- Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs)
  - pacemakers
  - Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs)
  - neurostimulators
- drug pumps
Wireless Communication

- patient data

- current settings

Wirelessly Reprogrammable

- alter device behavior non-invasively
ADVERSARY TYPES

- Adversary with a commercial ICD programmer
- Passive adversary (without commercial programmer)
- Active adversary (without commercial programmer)
INTERCEPTING ICD COMMUNICATIONS

- Reverse-engineered some of the communications protocol
- Constructed a commodity (not commercial) software radio
- Eavesdropping with Universal Software Radio Peripheral and GNU Radio libraries
EAVESDROPPING

- Patient data transmitted in cleartext
  - name
  - date of birth
  - medical ID number
  - patient history
- Also sent data about physician and ICD
ACTIVE ATTACKS

- Transmit-only replay attacks
  - disclosing ICD, patient, and cardiac data
  - changing patient name or ICD clock
  - changing therapies
  - inducing fibrillation (safeguards built into commercial model)
- Power denial of service attack
DEFENSE CONCERNS

- Balance security with ease of use in medical emergencies
- Zero-power defenses are ideal
  - ICDs run on batteries
  - Power is a precious commodity
  - Battery replacement can be invasive
ZERO-POWER DEFENSES

- Zero-Power Notification
- Zero-Power Authentication
- Zero-Power Sensible Key Exchange
ZERO-POWER NOTIFICATION

- Notifies patient of *any* activity
- Uses an implanted piezo-element to produce sound
- Built on Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP), which contains RFID technology
- WISP draws energy from the radio frequency signal, which is used for power instead of the battery
- Piezo-element can also produce vibration instead of sound
ZERO-POWER AUTHENTICATION

- All commercial programmers know a master key $K_M$, and each device has an identity $I$

1. Programmer submits a request to authenticate to WISP
2. WISP harvests power and responds with $I$ and a nonce $N$
3. Programmer computes $K = f(K_M, I)$ and sends $R = RC5(K, N)$
4. WISP verifies the correctness of $R$

- Successful zero-power authentication should be required before engaging in power-consuming processes
ZERO-POWER SENSIBLE KEY EXCHANGE

- Allows for secure communications between a programmer and an IMD
  1. Programmer supplies unmodulated radio frequency signal to power the IMD
  2. IMD generates and sends a random value as a session key
- Intended to not be easily overheard
QUESTIONS