“Crypto” Bigger Picture
Memory, Randomness, Anonymity, and Information Leakage

Tadayoshi Kohno

Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...
Randomness issues

Many applications (especially security ones) require randomness

“Obvious” uses:
- Generate secret cryptographic keys
- Generate random initialization vectors for encryption

Other “non-obvious” uses:
- Generate passwords for new users
- Shuffle the order of votes (in an electronic voting machine)
- Shuffle cards (for an online gambling site)
C’s rand() Function

C has a built-in random function: `rand()`

```c
unsigned long int next = 1;
/* rand: return pseudo-random integer on 0..32767 */
int rand(void) {
    next = next * 1103515245 + 12345;
    return (unsigned int)(next/65536) % 32768;
}
/* srand: set seed for rand() */
void srand(unsigned int seed) {
    next = seed;
}
```

Problem: don’t use `rand()` for security-critical applications!
  - Given a few sample outputs, you can predict subsequent ones
Randomness and the Netscape Browser

How secure is the World Wide Web?

Ian Goldberg and David Wagner

No one was more surprised than Netscape Communications when a pair of computer-science students broke the Netscape encryption scheme. Ian and David describe how they attacked the popular Web browser and what they found out.
Problems in Practice

- One institution used (something like) rand() to generate passwords for new users
  - Given your password, you could predict the passwords of other users

  - Random number generator improperly seeded
  - Possible to trivially break into machines that rely upon Kerberos for authentication

- Online gambling websites
  - Random numbers to shuffle cards
  - Real money at stake
  - But what if poor choice of random numbers?
In the rush to clean up the Debian-openssl fiasco, a number of other major security holes have been uncovered:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affected System</th>
<th>Security Problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fedora Core</td>
<td>Vulnerable to certain decoder rings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xandros (EEE PC)</td>
<td>Gives root access if asked in stern voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentoo</td>
<td>Vulnerable to flattery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLPC OS</td>
<td>Vulnerable to Jean Goldblum's powerbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slackware</td>
<td>Gives root access if user says elvish word for &quot;friend&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubuntu</td>
<td>Turns out distro is actually just Windows Vista with a few custom themes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xkcd
Big news... CNN, etc..
Obtaining Pseudorandom Numbers

For security applications, want “cryptographically secure pseudorandom numbers”

Libraries include:
- OpenSSL
- CryptoAPI (Microsoft)

Linux:
- /dev/random
- /dev/urandom

Internally:
- Pool from multiple sources (interrupt timers, keyboard, ...)
- Physical sources (radioactive decay, ...)

Secure Deletion

(See other slide deck, or paper here:  http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/.)
Disk Encryption and Other Applications

Unencrypted Disk — Encrypted Region

Encryption Program

Application (Word, Google Desktop, ...)

See Czeskis, St. Hilaire, Koscher, Gribble, Kohno, Schneier 2008
Anonymity
Privacy on Public Networks

- Internet is designed as a public network
  - Machines on your LAN may see your traffic, network routers see all traffic that passes through them

- Routing information is public
  - IP packet headers identify source and destination
  - Even a passive observer can easily figure out who is talking to whom

- Encryption does not hide identities
  - Encryption hides payload, but not routing information
  - Even IP-level encryption (tunnel-mode IPSec/ESP) reveals IP addresses of IPSec gateways
Applications of Anonymity (I)

- **Privacy**
  - Hide online transactions, Web browsing, etc. from intrusive governments, marketers and archivists

- **Untraceable electronic mail**
  - Corporate whistle-blowers
  - Political dissidents
  - Socially sensitive communications (online AA meeting)
  - Confidential business negotiations

- **Law enforcement and intelligence**
  - Sting operations and honeypots
  - Secret communications on a public network
Applications of Anonymity (II)

- Digital cash
  - Electronic currency with properties of paper money (online purchases unlinkable to buyer’s identity)
- Anonymous electronic voting
- Censorship-resistant publishing
What is Anonymity?

- Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects
  - You cannot be anonymous by yourself!
    - Big difference between anonymity and confidentiality
  - Hide your activities among others’ similar activities
- Unlinkability of action and identity
  - For example, sender and his email are no more related after observing communication than they were before
- Unobservability (hard to achieve)
Chaum’s Mix

❖ Early proposal for anonymous email

❖ Public key crypto + trusted re-mailer (Mix)
  • Untrusted communication medium
  • Public keys used as persistent pseudonyms

❖ Modern anonymity systems use Mix as the basic building block
Basic Mix Design

Adversary knows all senders and all receivers, but cannot link a sent message with a received message.
Anonymous Return Addresses

M includes $\{K_1, A\}_{pk(mix)}$, $K_2$ where $K_2$ is a fresh public key

$\{r_1, \{r_0, M\}_{pk(B)}, B\}_{pk(mix)}$

Response MIX

$A, \{\{r_2, M\}^{K_2}_{K_1}\}$

$\{K_1, A\}_{pk(mix)}, \{r_2, M'\}^{K_2}_{K_2}$

$\{r_0, M\}_{pk(B)}, B$

B

MIX
Mix Cascade

- Messages are sent through a sequence of mixes
  - Can also form an arbitrary network of mixes ("mixnet")
- Some of the mixes may be controlled by attacker, but even a single good mix guarantees anonymity
- Pad and buffer traffic to foil correlation attacks
Disadvantages of Basic Mixnets

- Public-key encryption and decryption at each mix are computationally expensive
- Basic mixnets have high latency
  - Ok for email, not Ok for anonymous Web browsing
- Challenge: low-latency anonymity network
  - Use public-key cryptography to establish a “circuit” with pairwise symmetric keys between hops on the circuit
  - Then use symmetric decryption and re-encryption to move data messages along the established circuits
  - Each node behaves like a mix; anonymity is preserved even if some nodes are compromised
Another Idea: Randomized Routing

- Hide message source by routing it randomly
  - Popular technique: Crowds, Freenet, Onion routing
- Routers don’t know for sure if the apparent source of a message is the true sender or another router
Onion Routing

[Reed, Syverson, Goldschlag ’97]

- Sender chooses a random sequence of routers
  - Some routers are honest, some controlled by attacker
  - Sender controls the length of the path
Route Establishment

- Routing info for each link encrypted with router’s public key
- Each router learns only the identity of the next router
Tor

- Second-generation onion routing network
  - http://tor.eff.org
  - Developed by Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson and Paul Syverson
  - Specifically designed for low-latency anonymous Internet communications
- Running since October 2003
- “Easy-to-use” client proxy
  - Freely available, can use it for anonymous browsing
Tor Circuit Setup (1)

- Client proxy establish a symmetric session key and circuit with Onion Router #1
Tor Circuit Setup (2)

- Client proxy extends the circuit by establishing a symmetric session key with Onion Router #2
  - Tunnel through Onion Router #1 (don’t need
Client proxy extends the circuit by establishing a symmetric session key with Onion Router #3

- Tunnel through Onion Routers #1 and #2
Using a Tor Circuit

- Client applications connect and communicate over the established Tor circuit
  - Datagrams are decrypted and re-encrypted at each link
Tor Management Issues

- Many applications can share one circuit
  - Multiple TCP streams over one anonymous connection

- Tor router doesn’t need root privileges
  - Encourages people to set up their own routers
  - More participants = better anonymity for everyone

- Directory servers
  - Maintain lists of active onion routers, their locations, current public keys, etc.
  - Control how new routers join the network
    - “Sybil attack”: attacker creates a large number of routers
  - Directory servers’ keys ship with Tor code
Attacks on Anonymity

- **Passive traffic analysis**
  - Infer from network traffic who is talking to whom
  - To hide your traffic, must carry other people’s traffic!

- **Active traffic analysis**
  - Inject packets or put a timing signature on packet flow

- **Compromise of network nodes**
  - Attacker may compromise some routers
  - It is not obvious which nodes have been compromised
    - Attacker may be passively logging traffic
  - Better not to trust any individual router
    - Assume that some fraction of routers is good, don’t know which
Deployed Anonymity Systems

- **Tor** (http://tor.eff.org)
  - Overlay circuit-based anonymity network
  - Best for low-latency applications such as anonymous Web browsing
- **Mixminion** (http://www.mixminion.net)
  - Network of mixes
  - Best for high-latency applications such as anonymous email
FoxTor, Images from http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/foxtor/
FoxTor, Images from [http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/foxtor/](http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/foxtor/)
FoxTor, Images from http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/foxtor/