CSE 484 (Winter 2008)

Applied Cryptography

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
Thanks to Dan Boneh, Dieter Gollmann, John Manferdelli, John Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, Bennet Yee, and many others for sample slides and materials ...

## Goals for Today


- Cryptography Background
- Symmetric (Shared-Key Foundations)


## Encrypting a Large Message


- So, we've got a good block cipher, but our plaintext is larger than 128-bit block size
   Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode
- IS latiger originations → ◆Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode • Split plaintext into blocks, encrypt each one separately using the block cipher • Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
   Split plaintext into blocks, XOR each block with the result of encrypting previous blocks
- Counter (CTR) mode
   Use block cipher to generate key
- Use block cipher to generate keystream, like a stream cipher
   ...





 Identical blocks of plaintext produce identical blocks of ciphertext
 No integrity checks: can mix and match blocks















# When Is a Cipher "Secure"?

- ◆ Hard to recover the key?
- What if attacker can learn plaintext without learning the key?
- Hard to recover plaintext from ciphertext?
   What if attacker learns some bits or some function of bits?
- Fixed mapping from plaintexts to ciphertexts?
   What if attacker sees two identical ciphertexts and infers that the corresponding plaintexts are identical?
- Implication: encryption must be randomized or stateful

#### How Can a Cipher Be Attacked?

- Assume that the attacker knows the encryption algorithm and wants to decrypt some ciphertext
- Main question: what else does attacker know?
  Depends on the application in which cipher is used!
- Ciphertext-only attack
- Known-plaintext attack (stronger)
   Knows some plaintext-ciphertext pairs
- Chosen-plaintext attack (even stronger)
  Can obtain ciphertext for any plaintext of his choice
- Chosen-ciphertext attack (very strong)
   Can decrypt any ciphertext <u>except</u> the target
- Sometimes very realistic model
- · Sometimes very realistic model



#### The Chosen-Plaintext Game

- ◆ Attacker does not know the key
- ♦ He chooses as many plaintexts as he wants, and learns the corresponding ciphertexts
- When ready, he picks two plaintexts M<sub>0</sub> and M<sub>1</sub>
   He is even allowed to pick plaintexts for which he previously learned ciphertexts!
- $\blacklozenge$  He receives either a ciphertext of  $\rm M_{0},$  or a ciphertext of  $\rm M_{1}$
- ◆ He wins if he guesses correctly which one it is


## Defining Security (Skip in Class)

- Idea: attacker should not be able to learn even a single bit of the encrypted plaintext
- Define  $Enc(M_0, M_1, b)$  to be a function that returns encrypted  $M_b$
- Given two plaintexts, Enc returns a ciphertext of one or the other depending on the value of bit b
- Think of Enc as a magic box that computes ciphertexts on attacker's demand. He can obtain a ciphertext of any plaintext M by submitting  $M_0$ = $M_1$ = $M_1$  or he can try to learn even more by submitting  $M_0$ = $M_1$ .
- ◆Attacker's goal is to learn just one bit b

# Why Hide Everything?

- Leaking even a little bit of information about the plaintext can be disastrous
- Electronic voting
- 2 candidates on the ballot (1 bit to encode the vote)
- If ciphertext leaks the parity bit of the encrypted plaintext, eavesdropper learns the entire vote
- ◆D-Day: Pas-de-Calais or Normandy?
- Allies convinced Germans that invasion will take place at Pas-de-Calais


   Dummy landing craft, feed information to double spies
- Goal: hide a 1-bit secret
- Also, want a strong definition, that implies others



#### Simple Example (Skip in Class)

- ◆<u>Any</u> deterministic, stateless symmetric encryption scheme is insecure
- Attacker can easily distinguish encryptions of different
- plaintexts from encryptions of identical plaintextsThis includes ECB mode of common block ciphers!
- Attacker A interacts with Enc(-,-,b)
- Let X,Y be any two different plaintexts
- $C_1 \leftarrow Enc(X,Y,b); C_2 \leftarrow Enc(Y,Y,b);$
- If  $C_1=C_2$  then b=1 else say b=0
- The advantage of this attacker A is 1


Prob(A outputs 1 if b=0)=0 Prob(A outputs 1 if b=1)=1



## Integrity vs. Secrecy

◆Integrity: attacker cannot tamper with message

- Encryption does not always guarantee integrity
- Intuition: attacker may able to modify message under encryption without learning what it is
- One-time pad: given key K, encrypt M as M⊕K
   This guarantees perfect secrecy, but attacker can easily change unknown M under encryption to M⊕M' for any M'
- Online auction: halve competitor's bid without learning its value
   This is recognized by industry standards (e.g., PKCS)
   "RSA encryption is intended primarily to provide confidentiality... It is not intended to provide integrity" (from RSA Labs Bulletin)



#### One-Way

- Intuition: hash should be hard to invert
  "Preimage resistance"
- Let h(x')=y∈{0,1}<sup>n</sup> for a random x'
- Given y, it should be hard to find any x such that h(x) =y

#### How hard?

- Brute-force: try every possible x, see if h(x)=y
- SHA-1 (common hash function) has 160-bit output

   Suppose have hardware that'll do 2<sup>30</sup> trials a pop
  - Assuming 2<sup>34</sup> trials per second, can do 2<sup>89</sup> trials per year
- Will take around 271 years to invert SHA-1 on a random image

#### Collision Resistance

- Should be hard to find distinct x, x' such that h(x)=h(x')
- Brute-force collision search is only O(2<sup>n/2</sup>), not O(2<sup>n</sup>)
- For SHA-1, this means O(2<sup>80</sup>) vs. O(2<sup>160</sup>)
- Birthday paradox (informal)
- Let t be the number of values x,x',x''... we need to look at before finding the first pair x,x' s.t. h(x)=h(x')
- What is probability of collision for each pair x,x?  $1/2^n$  How many pairs would we need to look at before finding the first collision?  $O(2^n)$
- How many pairs x,x' total? Choose(2,t)=t(t-1)/2 ~ O(t<sup>2</sup>) • What is t?  $2^{n/2}$

# One-Way vs. Collision Resistance

- ♦ One-wayness does <u>not</u> imply collision resistance
- Suppose g is one-way
- Define h(x) as g(x') where x' is x except the last bit

   h is one-way (to invert h, must invert g)
   Collisions for h are easy to find: for any x, h(x0)=h(x1)
- ◆ Collision resistance does <u>not</u> imply one-wayness
- Suppose g is collision-resistant
- Define h(x) to be 0x if x is n-bit long, 1g(x) otherwise
   Collisions for h are hard to find: if y starts with 0, then there are no collisions, if y starts with 1, then must find collisions in g
   h is not one way: half or all v|s (those whose first bit is 0) are easy to invert (how?); random y is invertible with probab. 1/2

#### Weak Collision Resistance

- ◆Given randomly chosen x, hard to find x' such that h(x)=h(x')
- Attacker must find collision for a <u>specific</u> x. By contrast, to break collision resistance, enough to find <u>any</u> collision.
- $\bullet$  Brute-force attack requires  $O(2^n)$  time
- AKA second-preimage collision resistance
- Weak collision resistance does <u>not</u> imply collision resistance