A fundamental problem

- Consider a client/server architecture
  - what happens to the service if a server crashes?
    - software failure, OS failure, hardware failure, power outage, earthquake, ...
  - Replication to the rescue
    - key idea: instead of having one server providing service to clients, have multiple servers providing the same service
    - each of the servers are called replicas
    - given N replicas, if one crashes, N-1 can still provide service
      - this assumes independent failures
    - replication therefore improves availability
    - however, it introduces a new problem: keeping replicas consistent with each other in the face of updates
Some quick math for the curious

- assume N replicas
  - assume a specified mean time between failure (MTBF)
    • with exponentially distributed failure arrivals
    • (in other words, a completely random process)
  - assume a specified mean time to repair (MTTR)
- what is the reliability of the overall system?

\[
\text{MTBF}_{\text{system}} \propto \frac{\text{MTBF}_{\text{replica}}^N}{\text{MTTR}_{\text{replica}}}
\]

- note that repair is a crucial part of the system!

The Replica Consistency problem

- Imagine we have two “bank” servers, and a client that updates its bank account
  - naïve replication strategy: client updates a random server. After update, the randomly chosen server propagates change to other server.
    • master/slave replication

• what are all the things that can go wrong?
What are we to do?

- One (of many) problems is that servers can have different views of the data at the same time
  - this is the very definition of inconsistency!
  - even worse, simultaneous updates can stomp on each other
    - inconsistency is never resolved
- Idea: update both servers at once?

```
S1
1. update
2. OK
S2
2. OK
1. update
client
```

But there are races…

- Two clients issuing updates at same time
  - messages may arrive in different orders at different servers
    - e.g. message #1 = “turn on light”, message #2 = “turn off light”
    - what’s the state of the light switch at each server?
- How did we deal with races in multithreaded code?
  - critical sections, mutual exclusion via locks:

```
S1
1. lock
2. OK
S2
2. OK
1. lock
client
```

```
S1
3. update
4. OK
S2
4. OK
3. update
client
```
More problems…

• But what about:
  – network failure
  – client failure
  – server failure
  – deadlock

• Seems insurmountable…
  – a generalized protocol (two-phase commit) was devised to deal with all of these difficulties
  – a key observation:
    • give servers (replicas) a chance to say “no”
    • if any replica says no, client “aborts” the operation

Two-phase commit

• Assumptions:
  – no byzantine failures (fail-stop)
  – goal: update all replicas atomically
    • either everybody commits update, or everybody aborts
    • no inconsistencies (including races from multiple clients)
    • even in the face of network and host failures

• Definitions:
  – coordinator: software entity that shepherds process
    • client in our example, not necessarily always so
  – replica: software entity to be updated by coordinator
  – ready to commit: side-effects of update are safely stored on durable, secondary storage
    • in other words, if a replica is ready to commit, then even if it crashes it can continue with two-phase commit
The Protocol

• Phase 1:
  – coordinator sends a PREPARE message to each replica
  – coordinator waits for all participants to vote
  – each participant:
    • votes PREPARED if it is ready to commit
      – also locks data item(s) being updated
    • votes NO for any reason
      – including inability to grab a lock
    • may delay voting arbitrarily…
• Phase 2:
  – if coordinator receives PREPARED from all replicas, it decides to commit. if not, it decides to abort.
    • at this point, the “transaction” or update is over
  – coordinator sends its decision to all participants
    • COMMIT or ABORT
      – participant marks decision, releases lock
    – participants acknowledge receipt with DONE

Outcome #1: COMMIT

```
PREPARE  
PREPARED

COMMIT  
DONE
```

coord  replica
Outcome #2: ABORT

- PREPARE
- NO
- ABORT
- DONE

Performance

- In the absence of failures, 2PC makes a total of 1.5 round-trips of messages before decision is made
  - prepare
  - vote to prepare
  - commit/abort
  - (note that the “DONE” is just for bookkeeping, it doesn’t affect response time)
Uncertainty

- Before it votes, a replica can unilaterally abort
- After it votes PREPARED and before it receives the coordinator’s decision, a replica is in an uncertain condition.
  - it can’t either commit or abort until it hears from coordinator

More uncertainty

- Note that the coordinator is never uncertain
  - it can always unilaterally abort, until it sends out a COMMIT
- If a participant fails or is partitioned during uncertain period…
  - it must contact coordinator to discover decision after recovery or network repair
    - implies coordinator must keep track of decisions
    - for how long?
Failure handling

- Failure is detected with timeouts
  - must eventually rely on timeouts in a distributed system
- If participant times out waiting for PREPARE
  - it can simply abort
- If coordinator times out waiting for a vote
  - it can simply abort
- If participant times out waiting for a decision
  - it becomes “blocked”
    - punt to some other resolution protocol
    - simplest one: wait for coordinator to recover
- If coordinator times out waiting for a done
  - ?