#### Lecture01

# CSE 417 Algorithms and Computational Complexity

Richard Anderson Autumn 2023 Lecture 1

#### CSE 417 Course Introduction

- CSE 417, Algorithms and Computational Complexity
  - MWF 10:30-11:20 AM
  - CSE2 G10
- Instructor
  - Richard Anderson, anderson@cs.washington.edu
  - Office hours:
    - · Office hours: Monday 2-3 pm, Thursday 4-5pm, CSE2 344
- Teaching Assistants
  - Megh Bhalerao, Tiernan Kennedy, Alex Li, Kaiyuan Liu, Sravani Nanduri, Albert Weng

#### Announcements


- It's on the course website
  - https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse417/23au/
- Homework weekly
  - Usually due Fridays
  - HW 1, Due Friday, October 6.
  - It's on the website
- Homework is to be submitted electronically
  - Due at 11:59 pm, Fridays. Five late days.
- Edstern Discussion Board

#### Textbook

- Algorithm Design
- · Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
  - Only one edition
- Read Chapters 1 & 2
- · Expected coverage:
  - Chapter 1 through 7
- · Book available at:
  - UW Bookstore (\$197.50/\$74.99)
  - Ebay (\$8.87 to \$181.70)
  - Amazon (\$159.99/\$24.90)
  - Electronic (\$74.99)
  - PDF








#### Course Mechanics

- Homework
  - Due Fridays
  - Mix of written problems and programming
  - Target: 1-week turnaround on grading
- Exams
  - Midterm, Monday, October 30
  - Final, Monday, December 11, 8:30-10:20 AM
  - Approximate grade weighting:
    - HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35
- Course web
  - Slides, Handouts, Discussion Board
- Canvas
  - Panopto videos

### All of Computer Science is the Study of Algorithms

How to study algorithms


- Zoology
- Mine is faster than yours is
- Algorithmic ideas
  - Where algorithms apply
  - What makes an algorithm work
  - Algorithmic thinking
- Algorithm practice \_\_\_\_



# Introductory Problem: Stable Matching

- Setting:
  - Assign TAs to Instructors
  - Avoid having TAs and Instructors wanting changes

 E.g., Prof A. would rather have student X than her current TA, and student X would rather work for Prof A. than his current instructor.



- Ho Formal notions

· Perfect matching

Ranked preference lists

Stability

W. M. Ws W. M. M.


# Example (1 of 3)

m<sub>1</sub>: W<sub>1</sub> W<sub>2</sub>

m<sub>2</sub>: W<sub>2</sub> W<sub>1</sub>

w<sub>1</sub>: m<sub>1</sub> m<sub>2</sub>

w<sub>2</sub>: m<sub>2</sub> m<sub>1</sub>




# Example (2 of 3)

m<sub>1</sub>: W<sub>1</sub> W<sub>2</sub>

m<sub>2</sub>: W<sub>1</sub> W<sub>2</sub>

w<sub>1</sub>: m<sub>1</sub> m<sub>2</sub>

 $w_2: m_1 m_2$ 




# Example (3 of 3)

m<sub>1</sub>: W<sub>1</sub> W<sub>2</sub>

m<sub>2</sub>: W<sub>2</sub> W<sub>1</sub>

w<sub>1</sub>: m<sub>2</sub> m<sub>1</sub>

w<sub>2</sub>: m<sub>1</sub> m<sub>2</sub>



#### Formal Problem

#### Input

- Preference lists for m<sub>1</sub>, m<sub>2</sub>, ..., m<sub>n</sub>
- Preference lists for w<sub>1</sub>, w<sub>2</sub>, ..., w<sub>n</sub>

#### Output

If  $(m', w') \in M$  and  $(m'', w'') \in M$  then (m' prefers w' to w") or (w" prefers m" to m')

# Idea for an Algorithm 1956

m proposes to w

If w is unmatched, w accepts

If w is matched to m<sub>2</sub>

If w prefers m to  $\mathbf{m}_2$  w accepts m, dumping  $\mathbf{m}_2$ 

If w prefers m2 to m, w rejects m

Unmatched m proposes to the highest w on its preference list that it has not already proposed to

M W

### Algorithm

Initially all m in M and w in W are free
While there is a free m
w highest on m's list that m has not proposed to
if w is free, then match (m, w)
else
suppose (m<sub>2</sub>, w) is matched
if w prefers m to m<sub>2</sub>
unmatch (m<sub>2</sub>, w)
match (m, w)

### Example

 $m_1$ :  $w_1 \, w_2 \, w_3$ 

 $m_{1}$ 

 $\bigcirc$ W<sub>1</sub>

 $m_2$ :  $w_1 \, w_3 \, w_2$ 

 $m_3$ :  $w_1 w_2 w_3$ 

 $m_2$ 

 $\bigcirc W_2$ 

w<sub>1</sub>: m<sub>2</sub> m<sub>3</sub> m<sub>1</sub>

w<sub>2</sub>: m<sub>3</sub> m<sub>1</sub> m<sub>2</sub>

w<sub>3</sub>: m<sub>3</sub> m<sub>1</sub> m<sub>2</sub>

 $m_3$ 

 $\bigcirc$  W<sub>3</sub>

#### Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?
- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
  - m's proposals get worse (have higher m-rank)
  - Once w is matched, w stays matched
  - w's partners get better (have lower w-rank)

# Claim: If an m reaches the end of its list, then all the w's are matched

# Claim: The algorithm stops in at most n<sup>2</sup> steps

# When the algorithms halts, every w is matched


Why?

Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect matching

### The resulting matching is stable

#### Suppose

$$(m_1, w_1) \in M, (m_2, w_2) \in M$$
  
 $m_1$  prefers  $w_2$  to  $w_1$ 



How could this happen?

#### Result

- Simple, O(n²) algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
  - A stable matching always exists