

# CSE 417 Algorithms and Computational Complexity

Richard Anderson  
Autumn 2023  
Lecture 1

## CSE 417 Course Introduction

- CSE 417, Algorithms and Computational Complexity
  - MWF 10:30-11:20 AM
  - CSE2 G10
- Instructor
  - Richard Anderson, [anderson@cs.washington.edu](mailto:anderson@cs.washington.edu)
  - Office hours:
    - Office hours: Monday 2-3 pm, Thursday 4-5pm, CSE2 344
- Teaching Assistants
  - Megh Bhalerao, Tiernan Kennedy, Alex Li, Kaiyuan Liu, Sravani Nanduri, Albert Weng

## Announcements

- It's on the course website
  - <https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse417/23au/>
- Homework weekly
  - Usually due Fridays
  - HW 1, Due Friday, October 6.
  - It's on the website
- Homework is to be submitted electronically
  - Due at 11:59 pm, Fridays. Five late days.
- Edstem Discussion Board

## Textbook

- Algorithm Design
- Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
  - Only one edition
- Read Chapters 1 & 2
- Expected coverage:
  - Chapter 1 through 7
- Book available at:
  - UW Bookstore (\$197.50/\$74.99)
  - Ebay (\$8.87 to \$181.70)
  - Amazon (\$159.99/\$24.90)
  - Electronic (\$74.99)
  - PDF



## Course Mechanics

- Homework
  - Due Fridays
  - Mix of written problems and programming
  - Target: 1-week turnaround on grading
- Exams
  - Midterm, Monday, October 30
  - Final, Monday, December 11, 8:30-10:20 AM
  - Approximate grade weighting:
    - HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35
- Course web
  - Slides, Handouts, Discussion Board
- Canvas
  - Panopto videos

## All of Computer Science is the Study of Algorithms

## How to study algorithms


- Zoology
- Mine is faster than yours is
- Algorithmic ideas
  - Where algorithms apply
  - What makes an algorithm work
  - Algorithmic thinking
- Algorithm practice

## Introductory Problem: Stable Matching

- Setting:
  - Assign TAs to Instructors
  - Avoid having TAs and Instructors wanting changes
    - E.g., Prof A. would rather have student X than her current TA, and student X would rather work for Prof A. than his current instructor.

## Formal notions

- Perfect matching
- Ranked preference lists
- Stability



## Example (1 of 3)

$m_1: w_1 w_2$	$m_1 \circ$	$\circ w_1$
$m_2: w_2 w_1$		
$w_1: m_1 m_2$		
$w_2: m_2 m_1$	$m_2 \circ$	$\circ w_2$

## Example (2 of 3)

$m_1: w_1 w_2$	$m_1 \circ$	$\circ w_1$
$m_2: w_1 w_2$		
$w_1: m_1 m_2$		
$w_2: m_1 m_2$	$m_2 \circ$	$\circ w_2$

## Example (3 of 3)

$m_1: w_1 w_2$	$m_1 \circ$	$\circ w_1$
$m_2: w_2 w_1$		
$w_1: m_2 m_1$		
$w_2: m_1 m_2$	$m_2 \circ$	$\circ w_2$

## Formal Problem

- Input
  - Preference lists for  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n$
  - Preference lists for  $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n$
- Output
  - Perfect matching  $M$  satisfying stability property:

If  $(m', w') \in M$  and  $(m'', w'') \in M$  then  
 ( $m'$  prefers  $w'$  to  $w''$ ) or ( $w''$  prefers  $m''$  to  $m'$ )

## Idea for an Algorithm

$m$  proposes to  $w$

If  $w$  is unmatched,  $w$  accepts

If  $w$  is matched to  $m_2$

If  $w$  prefers  $m$  to  $m_2$   $w$  accepts  $m$ , dumping  $m_2$

If  $w$  prefers  $m_2$  to  $m$ ,  $w$  rejects  $m$

Unmatched  $m$  proposes to the highest  $w$  on its preference list **that it has not already proposed to**

## Algorithm

Initially all  $m$  in  $M$  and  $w$  in  $W$  are free

While there is a free  $m$

$w$  highest on  $m$ 's list that  $m$  has not proposed to  
 if  $w$  is free, then match  $(m, w)$

else

suppose  $(m_2, w)$  is matched

if  $w$  prefers  $m$  to  $m_2$   
 unmatch  $(m_2, w)$   
 match  $(m, w)$

## Example

$m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3$

$m_1 \circ$

$\circ w_1$

$m_2: w_1 w_3 w_2$

$m_2 \circ$

$\circ w_2$

$m_3: w_1 w_2 w_3$

$w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1$

$w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$w_3: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$m_3 \circ$

$\circ w_3$

## Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?
- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
  - $m$ 's proposals get worse (have higher  $m$ -rank)
  - Once  $w$  is matched,  $w$  stays matched
  - $w$ 's partners get better (have lower  $w$ -rank)

Claim: If an  $m$  reaches the end of its list, then all the  $w$ 's are matched

Claim: The algorithm stops in at most  $n^2$  steps

When the algorithm halts, every  $w$  is matched

Why?


Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect matching

The resulting matching is stable

Suppose

$(m_1, w_1) \in M, (m_2, w_2) \in M$

$m_1$  prefers  $w_2$  to  $w_1$



How could this happen?

Result

- Simple,  $O(n^2)$  algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
  - A stable matching always exists