CSE 417
Algorithms and Computational Complexity

Richard Anderson

Autumn 2023

Lecture 1

CSE 417 Course Introduction

- CSE 417, Algorithms and Computational Complexity
  - MWF 10:30-11:20 AM
  - CSE2 G10
- Instructor
  - Richard Anderson, anderson@cs.washington.edu
  - Office hours:
    - Office hours: Monday 2-3 pm, Thursday 4-5pm, CSE2 344
- Teaching Assistants
  - Megh Bhalerao, Tiernan Kennedy, Alex Li, Kaiyuan Liu, Sravani Nanduri, Albert Weng

Announcements

- It's on the course website
  - https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse417/23au/
- Homework weekly
  - Usually due Fridays
  - HW 1, Due Friday, October 6.
  - It's on the website
- Homework is to be submitted electronically
  - Due at 11:59 pm, Fridays. Five late days.
- Edstem Discussion Board

Textbook

- Algorithm Design
- Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
  - Only one edition
- Read Chapters 1 & 2
- Expected coverage:
  - Chapter 1 through 7
- Book available at:
  - UW Bookstore ($197.50/$74.99)
  - Ebay ($8.87 to $181.70)
  - Amazon ($159.99/$24.90)
  - Electronic ($74.99)
  - PDF

Course Mechanics

- Homework
  - Due Fridays
  - Mix of written problems and programming
  - Target: 1-week turnaround on grading
- Exams
  - Midterm, Monday, October 30
  - Final, Monday, December 11, 8:30-10:20 AM
  - Approximate grade weighting:
    - HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35
- Course web
  - Slides, Handouts, Discussion Board
- Canvas
  - Panopto videos

All of Computer Science is the Study of Algorithms

How to study algorithms

- Zoology
- Mine is faster than yours is
- Algorithmic ideas
  - Where algorithms apply
  - What makes an algorithm work
  - Algorithmic thinking
- Algorithm practice

Introductory Problem: Stable Matching

- Setting:
  - Assign TAs to Instructors
  - Avoid having TAs and Instructors wanting changes
    - E.g., Prof A. would rather have student X than her current TA, and student X would rather work for Prof A. than his current instructor.

Formal notions

- Perfect matching
- Ranked preference lists
- Stability

Example (1 of 3)

m_1: w_1 w_2

m_2: w_2 w_1

w_1: m_1 m_2

w_2: m_2 m_1

m_1 ○   ○ w_1

m_2 ○   ○ w_2

Example (2 of 3)

m_1: w_1 w_2

m_2: w_1 w_2

w_1: m_1 m_2

w_2: m_1 m_2

m_1 ⬤   ⬤w_1

m_2 ⬤   ⬤ w_2

Example (3 of 3)

m_1: w_1 w_2

m_2: w_2 w_1

w_1: m_2 m_1

w_2: m_1 m_2

m_1 ○   ○ w_1

m_2 ○   ○ w_2

Formal Problem

- Input

  - Preference lists for m_1, m_2, …, m_n

  - Preference lists for w_1, w_2, …, w_n

- Output

  - Perfect matching M satisfying stability property:

If $(m', w') \in M$ and $(m'', w'') \in M$ then
$(m'$ prefers w' to $w'')$ or $(w''$ prefers m'' to $m')$

Idea for an Algorithm

m proposes to w

    If w is unmatched, w accepts

    If w is matched to m_2

        If w prefers m to m_2 w accepts m, dumping m_2

        If w prefers m_2 to m, w rejects m

Unmatched m proposes to the highest w on its preference list that it has not already proposed to

Algorithm

Initially all m in M and w in W are free

While there is a free m

       w highest on m's list that m has not proposed to

       if w is free, then match (m, w)

       else

              suppose (m_2, w) is matched

             if w prefers m to m_2

                   unmatch (m_2, w)

                   match (m, w)

Example

m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3

m_2: w_1 w_3 w_2

m_3: w_1 w_2 w_3

w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1

w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2

w_3: m_3 m_1 m_2

m_1 ◯   ◯ w_1

m_2 ◯   ◯ w_2

m_3 ◯   ◯ w_3

Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?

- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
  - m's proposals get worse (have higher m-rank)
  - Once w is matched, w stays matched
  - w's partners get better (have lower w-rank)

Claim: If an m reaches the end of its list, then all the w's are matched

Claim: The algorithm stops in at most n^2 steps

# When the algorithms halts, every w is matched

Why?

Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect matching

The resulting matching is stable

Suppose

    $(m_1, w_1) \in M$, $(m_2, w_2) \in M$

    m_1 prefers w_2 to w_1

How could this happen?

Result

- Simple, $O(n^2)$ algorithm to compute a stable matching

- Corollary
  - A stable matching always exists