

CSE 417
Algorithms and Computational
Complexity

Richard Anderson

Winter 2020



Lecture 2

Announcements

- Course website
 - <https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse417/20wi/>
- Homework due Wednesdays (strict)
 - HW 1, Due Wednesday, January 15, 9:29 AM.
 - Submit solutions on canvas
- You should be on the course mailing list
 - But it will probably go to your uw.edu account

Course Mechanics

- Homework
 - Due Wednesdays
 - About 5 problems, sometimes programming
 - Programming – your choice of language
 - Target: 1 week turnaround on grading
- Exams (In class)
 - Midterm, TBD
 - Final, Wednesday, March 18, 8:30-10:20 am
- **Approximate** grade weighting
 - HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35
- Course web
 - Slides, Handouts
- Instructor Office hours (CSE2 344):
 - Monday 2:30-3:30, Wednesday 2:30-3:30



TA Office Hours

Yuqing Ai, Tuesday, 3:00-4:00, CSE2 131

Alex Fang, Thursday, 1:30-2:30, CSE2 151

Anny Kong, Monday, 3:30-4:30, TBA

Zhichao Lei, Monday, 4:30-5:30, CSE1 007

Ansh Nagda, Tuesday, 11:30-12:30, CSE2 152

Chris Nie, Friday, 3:30-4:30, CSE2 121

Stable Matching: Formal Problem

- Input
 - Preference lists for m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n
 - Preference lists for w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n
- Output
 - Perfect matching M satisfying stability property (e.g., no instabilities) :

For all m', m'', w', w''

If $(m', w') \in M$ and $(m'', w'') \in M$ then

$(m'$ prefers w' to w'') or $(w''$ prefers m'' to $m')$

Idea for an Algorithm

m proposes to w

If w is unmatched, w accepts

If w is matched to m_2

If w prefers m to m_2 , w accepts m, dumping m_2

If w prefers m_2 to m, w rejects m

Unmatched m proposes to the highest w on its preference list **that it has not already proposed to**

Algorithm

Initially all m in M and w in W are free

While there is a free m

w highest on m 's list that m has not proposed to
 if w is free, then match (m, w)

 else

 suppose (m_2, w) is matched

 if w prefers m to m_2

 unmatch (m_2, w)

 match (m, w)

Example

$m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3$


$m_2: w_1 w_3 w_2$

$m_3: w_1 w_2 w_3$

$w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1$

$w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$w_3: m_3 m_1 m_2$



Order: $m_1, m_2, m_3, m_1, m_3, m_1$

Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?
- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
 - m 's proposals get worse (have higher m -rank)
 - Once w is matched, w stays matched
 - w 's partners get better (have lower w -rank)

Claim: If an m reaches the end of its list, then all the w 's are matched

Claim: The algorithm stops in at most n^2 steps

When the algorithm halts, every w
is matched


Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect
matching

The resulting matching is stable

Suppose

$(m_1, w_1) \in M, (m_2, w_2) \in M$

m_1 prefers w_2 to w_1



How could this happen?

Result

- Simple, $O(n^2)$ algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
 - A stable matching always exists

A closer look

Stable matchings are not necessarily fair

$m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3$


$m_2: w_2 w_3 w_1$

$m_3: w_3 w_1 w_2$

$w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1$

$w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$w_3: m_1 m_2 m_3$



How many stable matchings can you find?

Algorithm under specified

- Many different ways of picking m's to propose
- Surprising result
 - All orderings of picking free m's give the same result
- Proving this type of result
 - Reordering argument
 - Prove algorithm is computing something more specific
 - Show property of the solution – so it computes a specific stable matching

M-rank and W-rank of matching

- m-rank: position of matching w in preference list
- M-rank: sum of m-ranks
- w-rank: position of matching m in preference list
- W-rank: sum of w-ranks

$m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3$


$m_2: w_1 w_3 w_2$

$m_3: w_1 w_2 w_3$

$w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1$

$w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2$

$w_3: m_3 m_1 m_2$



What is the M-rank?

What is the W-rank?

Suppose there are n m 's, and n w 's

- What is the minimum possible M-rank?
- What is the maximum possible M-rank?
- Suppose each m is matched with a random w , what is the expected M-rank?

Random Preferences

Suppose that the preferences are completely random

$m_1: w_8 w_3 w_1 w_5 w_9 w_2 w_4 w_6 w_7 w_{10}$

$m_2: w_7 w_{10} w_1 w_9 w_3 w_4 w_8 w_2 w_5 w_6$

...

$w_1: m_1 m_4 m_9 m_5 m_{10} m_3 m_2 m_6 m_8 m_7$

$w_2: m_5 m_8 m_1 m_3 m_2 m_7 m_9 m_{10} m_4 m_6$

...

If there are n m 's and n w 's, what is the expected value of the M -rank and the W -rank when the proposal algorithm computes a stable matching?

Stable Matching Algorithms

- M Proposal Algorithm
 - Iterate over all m's until all are matched
- W Proposal Algorithm
 - Change the role of m's and w's
 - Iterate over all w's until all are matched

Generating a random permutation

```
public static int[] Permutation(int n, Random rand) {  
    int[] arr = IdentityPermutation(n);  
  
    for (int i = 1; i < n; i++) {  
        int j = rand.Next(0, i + 1);  
        int temp = arr[i];  
        arr[i] = arr[j];  
        arr[j] = temp;  
    }  
    return arr;  
}
```

What is the run time of the Stable Matching Algorithm?

Initially all m in M and w in W are free

While there is a free m **Executed at most n^2 times**

w highest on m 's list that m has not proposed to
 if w is free, then match (m, w)

 else

 suppose (m_2, w) is matched

 if w prefers m to m_2

 unmatch (m_2, w)

 match (m, w)

$O(1)$ time per iteration

- Find free m
- Find next available w
- If w is matched, determine m_2
- Test if w prefer m to m_2
- Update matching

What does it mean for an algorithm
to be efficient?

Key ideas

- Formalizing real world problem
 - Model: graph and preference lists
 - Mechanism: stability condition
- Specification of algorithm with a natural operation
 - Proposal
- Establishing termination of process through invariants and progress measure
- Under specification of algorithm
- Establishing uniqueness of solution