CSE 417
Algorithms and Computational Complexity

Richard Anderson

Winter 2020

Lecture 1

CSE 417 Course Introduction

- CSE 417, Algorithms and Computational Complexity
  - MWF, 9:30-10:20 am
  - CSE2 G01
- Instructor
  - Richard Anderson, anderson@cs.washington.edu
  - Office hours:
    - CSE2 344
    - Office hours: Monday 2:30-3:30, Wednesday 2:30-3:30
- Teaching Assistants
  - Yuqing Ai, Alex Fang, Anny Kong, Zhichao Lei, Ansh Nagda, Chris Nie

Announcements

- It's on the course website
- Homework due Wednesdays
  - HW 1, Due January 15, 2020
  - It's on the website (or will be soon)
- Homework is to be submitted electronically
  - Due at 9:30 AM. No late days.
- You should be on the course mailing list
  - But it will probably go to your uw.edu account

Textbook

- Algorithm Design
- Jon Kleinberg, Eva Tardos
  - Only one edition
- Read Chapters 1 & 2
- Expected coverage:
  - Chapter 1 through 7
- Book available at:
  - UW Bookstore ($171.25/$128.45)
  - Ebay ($24.10)
  - Amazon ($29.10 and up)
  - Electronic ($74.99 / $44.99)
  - Paperback ($39.95)
  - PDF



Course Mechanics

- Homework
  - Due Wednesdays
  - Mix of written problems and programming
  - Target: 1-week turnaround on grading
- Exams (In class)
  - Midterm, Approximately Friday, February 7
  - Final, Wednesday, March 18, 8:30-10:20 am
- Approximate grade weighting:
  - HW: 50, MT: 15, Final: 35
- Course web
  - Slides, Handouts, Piazza Discussion Board

All of Computer Science is the Study of Algorithms

How to study algorithms

- Zoology
- Mine is faster than yours is
- Algorithmic ideas
  - Where algorithms apply
  - What makes an algorithm work
  - Algorithmic thinking
- Algorithm practice

Introductory Problem: Stable Matching

- Setting:
  - Assign TAs to Instructors
  - Avoid having TAs and Instructors wanting changes
    - E.g., Prof A. would rather have student X than her current TA, and student X would rather work for Prof A. than his current instructor.

Formal notions

- Perfect matching
- Ranked preference lists
- Stability



Example (1 of 3)

m_1: w_1 w_2
m_2: w_2 w_1
w_1: m_1 m_2
w_2: m_2 m_1



Example (2 of 3)

m_1: w_1 w_2
m_2: w_1 w_2
w_1: m_1 m_2
w_2: m_1 m_2



Example (3 of 3)

m_1: w_1 w_2
m_2: w_2 w_1
w_1: m_2 m_1
w_2: m_1 m_2



Formal Problem

- Input
  - Preference lists for $m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_n$
  - Preference lists for $w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n$
- Output
  - Perfect matching M satisfying stability property:

If (m', w') ∈ M and (m'', w'') ∈ M then
(m' prefers w' to w'') or (w'' prefers m'' to m')

Idea for an Algorithm

m proposes to w

If w is unmatched, w accepts

If w is matched to m_2

If w prefers m to m_2 w accepts m, dumping m_2

If w prefers m_2 to m, w rejects m

Unmatched m proposes to the highest w on its preference list that it has not already proposed to

Algorithm

```
Initially all m in M and w in W are free
While there is a free m
        w highest on m's list that m has not proposed to
        if w is free, then match (m, w)
        else
                suppose (m2, w) is matched
                if w prefers m to m2
                        unmatch (m2, w)
                        match (m, w)
```

Example

m_1: w_1 w_2 w_3

m_2: w_1 w_3 w_2

m_3: w_1 w_2 w_3

w_1: m_2 m_3 m_1

w_2: m_3 m_1 m_2

w_3: m_3 m_1 m_2



Does this work?

- Does it terminate?
- Is the result a stable matching?

- Begin by identifying invariants and measures of progress
  - m's proposals get worse (have higher m-rank)
  - Once w is matched, w stays matched
  - w's partners get better (have lower w-rank)

Claim: If an m reaches the end of its list, then all the w's are matched

Claim: The algorithm stops in at most n^2 steps

When the algorithms halts, every w is matched

Why?

Hence, the algorithm finds a perfect matching

The resulting matching is stable

Suppose

$(m_1, w_1) \in M$, $(m_2, w_2) \in M$

m_1 prefers w_2 to w_1



How could this happen?

Result

- Simple, $O(n^2)$ algorithm to compute a stable matching
- Corollary
  - A stable matching always exists