CSE 417, Winter 2012

Introduction, Examples, and Analysis

Ben Birnbaum
Widad Machmouchi

Slides adapted from Larry Ruzzo, Steve Tanimoto, and Kevin Wayne
CSE 417: Algorithms and Computational Complexity

• Instructors:
  – Ben Birnbaum (Computer Science Ph.D.)
  – Widad Machmouchi (Computer Science Ph.D.)
  – (Mostly) team-teaching by unit

• TAs:
  – Nara Kim (Computer Science B.S.)
  – Alex Piet (Applied Math M.S.)
Lecture: EEB 037 (schematic)  MWF 2:30-3:20

Instructors: Ben Birnbaum  Email: birnbaum at cs  Office Hours: M 11:00-12:00 (CSE 212)
Widad Machmouchi  email at cs  T 2:30-3:30 (CSE 212)

TAs: Nam Kim,  Email: naram at uw  TBA
Alex Piet  Email: alexpriet at uw

Course Discussion Board: The instructors and students may discuss homework problems together, but they must write their own solutions. Late homeworks will not be accepted. If there are extenuating circumstances, prior permission must be requested from one of the instructors. Outside sources (Google, other textbooks, people not in the class, etc.) may not be consulted.

Grading: An overall numeric grade will be calculated using the weighting: homework 60%, midterm 15%, final 25%. This numeric grade will be converted to a course grade at the end of the course. Extra credit will be tallied separately and considered subjectively when calculating the course grade.

Prerequisite: CSE 373

Credits: 3

Textbook:
- Algorithm Design by Jon Kleinberg and Eva Tardos. Addison Wesley, 2006. (Available from the U Book Store, Amazon, etc.)

Based on past experience, we will probably have little if any time to cover the "computability" material outlined in the catalog description. If you
Other resources
(all linked from website)

• Catalyst discussion board (use it!)
• Course email list
• Schedule
• Office hours
  – Ben: M 11-12
  – Widad: T 2:30-3:30
  – Nara and Alex (TBD)
Textbook
What you have to do

• Homework (60%)
  – Roughly 8 weekly assignments, due on Wednesday.
    • Mostly written design, analysis, and argument.
    • A couple of small programming assignments.
  – Late assignments not accepted
  – Turn in each question on its own page
  – Can discuss with classmates, writeups must be your own. Do not consult other textbooks, Google, etc.
  – Extra credit counted separately and considered subjectively.
  – Extra credit given for exceptional solutions.

• In-class midterm, Feb. 8 (15%)
• Final, Mar. 13 2:30-4:30 (25%)
• This class stresses problem solving and proofs. These are hard. We will curve generously.
• Ask questions!
Homework 0

• Complete our online background survey by this Friday, January 6.

• Will count for 10 homework points (about ¼ of a typical homework).

• No wrong answers.

• Available on website.
What the course is about

• Algorithm design (first 7 weeks)
  – Design methods (greedy, divide & conquer, dynamic programming, etc.)
  – Analysis of algorithms, efficiency
  – Correctness proofs
• Intractability (last 3 weeks)
  – Important to know when problems cannot be solved efficiently.
  – NP-completeness theory captures many problems that (probably) cannot be solved efficiently.
• Schedule is available online
Reading

• KT, Chapter 1
• KT, Chapter 2.1 – 2.4
Chapter 1

Introduction: Some Representative Problems
1.1 A First Problem: Stable Matching
Motivation: a job application process.

Setting. College seniors applying for jobs. Each student has preferences on employers. Each employer has preferences on students.

Goal. Given a set of preferences, assign students to employers in a self-reinforcing way.

Unstable pair: applicant a and employer e are unstable if:
- a prefers e to her assigned employer.
- e prefers a to one of its accepted students.

Stable assignment. Assignment with no unstable pairs.
- Natural and desirable condition.
- Individual self-interest will prevent any applicant/employer deal from being made.
An abstraction: the Stable Matching Problem

**Goal.** Given n men and n women, find a "suitable" matching.
- Participants rate members of opposite sex.
- Each man lists women in order of preference from best to worst.
- Each woman lists men in order of preference from best to worst.

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**Men’s Preference Profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xavier</td>
<td>Amy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yancey</td>
<td>Bertha</td>
<td>Amy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zeus</td>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>Bertha</td>
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</table>

**Women’s Preference Profile**

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Clare</td>
<td>Zeus</td>
<td>Yancey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An abstraction: the Stable Matching Problem

**Perfect matching**: everyone is matched monogamously.
- Each man gets exactly one woman.
- Each woman gets exactly one man.

**Stability**: no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action.
- In matching $M$, an unmatched pair $m-w$ is unstable if man $m$ and woman $w$ prefer each other to current partners.
- Unstable pair $m-w$ could each improve by eloping.

**Stable matching**: perfect matching with no unstable pairs.

**Stable matching problem.** Given the preference lists of $n$ men and $n$ women, find a stable matching if one exists.
Q. Is assignment $X$-$A$, $Y$-$B$, $Z$-$C$ stable?
Q. Is assignment X-A, Y-B, Z-C stable?
A. No. Zeus and Berta will hook up. (They are an unstable pair.)
Stable Matching Problem

Q. Is assignment X-C, Y-A, Z-B stable?
Q. Is assignment X-C, Y-A, Z-B stable?
A. Yes. (No unstable pairs.)

Q. Do stable matchings always exist?
A. Not obvious.
Propose-And-Reject Algorithm


Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
    Choose such a man m
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
    if (w is free)
        assign m and w to be engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
        assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}
Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
  Choose such a man m
  w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
  if (w is free)
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}
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
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    if (w is free)
        assign m and w to be engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m’)
        assign m and w to be engaged
        assign m’ to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}
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        assign m and w to be engaged
        assign m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}

Y proposes to B.
Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
    Choose such a man \( m \)
    \( w = \text{1st woman on } m\text{'s list to whom } m \text{ has not yet proposed} \)
    if (\( w \) is free)
        \( m \) and \( w \) to be engaged
    else if (\( w \) prefers \( m \) to her fiancé \( m' \))
        \( m \) and \( w \) to be engaged
        \( m' \) to be free
    else
        \( w \) rejects \( m \)
}

B accepts Y's proposal.
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
    Choose such a man m
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
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        assign m and w to be engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
        assign m and w to be engaged
        assign m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}

Z proposes to A.
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

A rejects Z's proposal. (She prefers X.)
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) { 
    Choose such a man m
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
    if (w is free)
        assign m and w to be engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
        assign m and w to be engaged
        assign m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
  Choose such a man $m$
  $w =$ 1st woman on $m$'s list to whom $m$ has not yet proposed
  if ($w$ is free)
    assign $m$ and $w$ to be engaged
  else if ($w$ prefers $m$ to her fiancé $m'$)
    assign $m$ and $w$ to be engaged
    assign $m'$ to be free
  else
    $w$ rejects $m$
}

B accepts $Z$'s proposal (and breaks engagement with $Y$).
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
  Choose such a man $m$
  $w = 1^{st}$ woman on $m$'s list to whom $m$ has not yet proposed
  if ($w$ is free)
    assign $m$ and $w$ to be engaged
  else if ($w$ prefers $m$ to her fiancé $m'$)
    assign $m$ and $w$ to be engaged
    assign $m'$ to be free
  else
    $w$ rejects $m$
}

$Y$ proposes to $A$. 
A accepts Y's proposal (and breaks engagement with X).
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.

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    assign m and w to be engaged
    assign m' to be free
  else
    w rejects m
}

B rejects X’s proposal. (She prefers Z.)
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
  Choose such a man m
  w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
  if (w is free)
    assign m and w to be engaged
  else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
    assign m and w to be engaged
    assign m' to be free
  else
    w rejects m
}

X proposes to C.
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
    Choose such a man m
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
    if (w is free)
        assign m and w to be engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
        assign m and w to be engaged
        assign m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}

C accepts X's proposal.
Propose-and-Reject Algorithm, Illustrated

Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
    Choose such a man m
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        assign m and w to be engaged
        assign m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}

A stable matching!

Q. Does this algorithm always work?
A. Yes! (We need to prove this.)
Proof of Correctness: Termination

**Observation 1.** Once a woman is matched, she never becomes unmatched; she only "trades up."

**Observation 2.** Men propose to women in decreasing order of preference.

**Claim.** Algorithm terminates after at most $n^2$ iterations of while loop.

**Pf.** Each time through the while loop a man proposes to a new woman. There are only $n^2$ possible proposals. □
Proof of Correctness: Perfection

**Claim.** All men and women get matched.

**Pf.** (by contradiction)

- Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists someone who is not matched.
- Then since the number of men matched is the same as the number of women, there must exist both a man and a woman that are not matched. Call them m and w.
- By Observation 1 (once a woman is matched, she stays matched), w was never proposed to.
- But, because m is unmatched at the end of the algorithm, the only way the while loop could have terminated is if he proposed to everyone, including w.
- This is a contradiction, so we conclude that all men, and hence all women, must be matched.
Proof of Correctness: Stability

Claim. No unstable pairs.

Pf. (by contradiction)

- Suppose m-w is an unstable pair: each prefers each other to partner in Gale-Shapley matching.

- Case 1: m never proposed to w.
  $\Rightarrow$ m prefers his GS partner to w.
  $\Rightarrow$ m-w is stable.

- Case 2: m proposed to w.
  $\Rightarrow$ w rejected m (right away or later)
  $\Rightarrow$ w prefers her GS partner to m.
  $\Rightarrow$ m-w is stable.

- In either case m-w is stable, a contradiction. □
Summary

**Stable matching problem.** Given n men and n women, and their preferences, find a stable matching if one exists.

Remember, it’s not even clear if a stable matching always exists!

**Gale-Shapley algorithm.** Shows that a stable matching always exists by giving an algorithm guaranteed to find one for any problem instance.

That’s pretty cool.
Warm up

A B C
X Y Z

B C A
Y X Z

B A C
Z X Y

A B C
X Y Z
This is stable even though Z and C hate each other.
Why did everyone get the same answer? (Theorem 1.7 in book).
Who cares? Matching Residents to Hospitals

Before 1952:

“In general, hospitals benefited from filling their positions as early as possible, and applicants benefited from delaying acceptance of positions. The combination of these factors lead to offers being made for positions up to two years in advance. While efforts made to delay the start of the application process were somewhat effective, they ultimately resulted in very short deadlines for responses by applicants, and the opportunities for dissatisfaction on the part of both applicants and hospitals remained.” (Gusfield and Irving 1989, via Wikipedia).

After 1952:

The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)
Men ≈ hospitals, Women ≈ med school residents.

**Variant 1.** Some participants declare others as unacceptable.

**Variant 2.** Unequal number of men and women.

**Variant 3.** Limited polygamy.

**Def.** Matching is **unstable** if there is a hospital h and resident r such that:
- h and r are acceptable to each other; and
- either r is unmatched, or r prefers h to her assigned hospital; and
- either h does not have all its places filled, or h prefers r to at least one of its assigned residents.

A variant of the GS algorithm works, and is used!
Lessons Learned

Powerful ideas learned in course.
- Isolate underlying structure of problem.
- Create useful and efficient algorithms that are provably correct.
Basics of Algorithm Analysis

"For me, great algorithms are the poetry of computation. Just like verse, they can be terse, allusive, dense, and even mysterious. But once unlocked, they cast a brilliant new light on some aspect of computing." - Francis Sullivan
(Preliminary) Survey Results

With 43 respondents,

• 9% are not at all comfortable with asymptotic analysis (Big “Oh” notation)
• 47% are somewhat comfortable
• 44% are very comfortable
What does it mean to bound the
running time of an algorithm?

Depends on how you measure it.

Which computer?
Which programming language?
Clock time, or something else?

Even if we fix a model, it still depends on the input.
What does it mean to bound the running time of an algorithm?

Any bound depends on the size of the input, e.g. $T(n) = 3n^2 + 5n - 2$.

But there are many different inputs of the same size.

How should one bound apply to all of them?
Complexity analysis

Problem size n

*Best-case complexity:* 
fastest time on any input of size n

*Average-case complexity:* 
average time on inputs of size n

*Worst-case complexity:* 
slowest time on any input of size n
Pros and cons:

Best-case
  unrealistic oversell

Average-case
  over what probability distribution? (different people may have different “average” problems)
  analysis often hard

Worst-case?
  a fast algorithm has a comforting guarantee
  maybe too pessimistic
Why Worst-Case Analysis?

Comforting guarantee.
Appropriate for time-critical applications, e.g. avionics.
Unlike Average-Case, no debate about what the right definition is.
Analysis often easier.
Result is often representative of "typical" problem instances.
Of course there are exceptions…
What about the model?

Let’s say we have bounded the worst-case running time on a particular computer as
\[ T(n) = 3n^2 + 5n - 2. \]
What about a computer that’s twice as fast? What if the compiler changes? The running time could change. We need a way to describe running times that is independent of this.
That’s where asymptotic analysis comes in.
That’s where asymptotic analysis comes in.

Given two functions $f$ and $g$: $N \rightarrow R$

- $f(n)$ is $O(g(n))$ iff there is a constant $c > 0$ so that $f(n)$ is eventually always $\leq c \cdot g(n)$

- $f(n)$ is $\Omega(g(n))$ iff there is a constant $c > 0$ so that $f(n)$ is eventually always $\geq c \cdot g(n)$

- $f(n)$ is $\Theta(g(n))$ iff $f(n)$ is $O(g(n))$ and $f(n)$ is $\Omega(g(n))$. 
Complexity

Problem size

Time

T(n)

2n \log_2 n

n \log_2 n
Claim: For any a, and any b>0, \((n+a)^b\) is \(\Theta(n^b)\)

\[(n+a)^b \leq (2n)^b \quad \text{for } n \geq |a|\]
\[= 2^b n^b\]
\[= cn^b \quad \text{for } c = 2^b\]
so \((n+a)^b\) is \(O(n^b)\)

\[(n+a)^b \geq (n/2)^b \quad \text{for } n \geq 2|a| \text{ (even if } a < 0)\]
\[= 2^{-b} n^b\]
\[= c' n \quad \text{for } c' = 2^{-b}\]
so \((n+a)^b\) is \(\Omega(n^b)\)
Working with $\Theta$-$\Omega$-$\Theta$ notation

Claim: For any $a, b > 1$ \( \log_a n \) is $\Theta(\log_b n)$

\[ \log_a b = x \text{ means } a^x = b \]
\[ a^{\log_a b} = b \]
\[ (a^{\log_a b})^{\log_b n} = b^{\log_b n} = n \]
\[ (\log_a b)(\log_b n) = \log_a n \]
\[ c \log_b n = \log_a n \text{ for the constant } c = \log_a b \]

So:
\[ \log_b n = \Theta(\log_a n) = \Theta(\log n) \]
Asymptotic Bounds for Some Common Functions

Polynomials:
\[ a_0 + a_1n + \ldots + a_dn^d \text{ is } \Theta(n^d) \text{ if } a_d > 0 \]

Logarithms:
For all \( x > 0 \), \( \log n = O(n^x) \)

log grows slower than every polynomial
Asymptotic Bounds for Some Common Functions

Exponentials. For all \( r > 1 \) and all \( d > 0 \), \( n^d = O(r^n) \).
“One-Way Equalities”

What’s ok to write?

- $2n^2 + 5n$ is $O(n^3)$
- $2n^2 + 5n = O(n^3)$
  - \(\text{\cancel{O}}(n^3) = 2n^2 + 5n\)

Bottom line:

- OK to put big-O in R.H.S. of equality, but not left.
- [Better, but uncommon, notation: \(T(n) \in O(f(n))\).]
Just the right level of precision

- It’s not realistic to be more precise than up to a constant factor.
- On the other hand, order of growth really matters...
Here’s why order of growth matters

Table 2.1 The running times (rounded up) of different algorithms on inputs of increasing size, for a processor performing a million high-level instructions per second. In cases where the running time exceeds $10^{25}$ years, we simply record the algorithm as taking a very long time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$n \log_2 n$</th>
<th>$n^2$</th>
<th>$n^3$</th>
<th>$1.5^n$</th>
<th>$2^n$</th>
<th>$n!$</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$n = 10$</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
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<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>18 min</td>
<td>$10^{25}$ years</td>
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<tr>
<td>$n = 50$</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>11 min</td>
<td>36 years</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n = 100$</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>1 sec</td>
<td>12,892 years</td>
<td>$10^{17}$ years</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n = 1,000$</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>1 sec</td>
<td>18 min</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n = 10,000$</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td>12 days</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n = 100,000$</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>2 sec</td>
<td>3 hours</td>
<td>32 years</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
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<tr>
<td>$n = 1,000,000$</td>
<td>1 sec</td>
<td>20 sec</td>
<td>12 days</td>
<td>31,710 years</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
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All of these functions have different orders of growth. That is, for no two functions $f$ and $g$ is it the case that $f = \Theta(g)$.  

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Now back to the model

With asymptotic notation, we don’t worry too much about the model of computation. We just need something reasonable.

Time $\approx$ # of instructions executed in a simple programming language

only simple operations (+, *, -, =, if, call, …)

each operation takes one time step

each memory access takes one time step

no fancy stuff (add these two matrices, copy this long string, …) built in; write it/charge for it as above
Is this reasonable?

Initialize each person to be free.
while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
Choose such a man m
w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
if (w is free)
    assign m and w to be engaged
else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
    assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free
else
    w rejects m
}

It's good pseudo-code, but not clear if every step can be implemented in constant time.
So what is efficient?

Table 2.1 The running times (rounded up) of different algorithms on inputs of increasing size, for a processor performing a million high-level instructions per second. In cases where the running time exceeds $10^{25}$ years, we simply record the algorithm as taking a very long time.

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<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>18 min</td>
<td>$10^{25}$ years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td></td>
<td>36 years</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>1 sec</td>
<td>12,892 years</td>
<td>$10^{17}$ years</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>1 sec</td>
<td>18 min</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td>12 days</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>&lt; 1 sec</td>
<td>2 sec</td>
<td>3 hours</td>
<td>32 years</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1 sec</td>
<td>20 sec</td>
<td>12 days</td>
<td>31,710 years</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
<td>very long</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Polynomial time: running time is $O(n^d)$ for some constant $d$ independent of the input size $n$
Why Polynomial Time?

Not a perfect definition:

\[ n^{100} \text{ vs. } n^{1+.02(\log n)} \]

But it generally works in practice.

Usually, polynomial is faster than the “brute force” solution, so such a solution signifies insight.

Negatable.
Initialize each person to be free.

while (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) {
    Choose such a man m
    w = 1st woman on m's list to whom m has not yet proposed
    if (w is free)
        assign m and w to be engaged
    else if (w prefers m to her fiancé m')
        assign m and w to be engaged, and m' to be free
    else
        w rejects m
}

We showed that the algorithm takes $O(n^2)$ iterations. But can we also show it takes $O(n^2)$ time?

Yes!
Efficient Implementation

We need to perform the following operations in constant time:

- Identify a free man.
- For a man $m$, identify the highest-ranked woman to whom he has not yet proposed.
- Decide if a woman $w$ is currently engaged, and if she is, identify her current partner.
- For a woman $w$ and two men $m$ and $m'$, be able to decide which of $m$ or $m'$ is preferred by $w$.

Represent men and women as numbers 1 through $n$.

Maintain the following data structures

- FreeList
- $\text{ManPref}[m, i], \text{WomanPref}[w, i]$
- Next[$m$]
- Current[$w$]
- Ranking[$w, m$]
**Efficient Implementation**

**Women rejecting/accepting.**
- Does woman $w$ prefer man $m$ to man $m'$?
- For each woman, create inverse of preference list of men.
- Constant time access for each query after $O(n)$ preprocessing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amy</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>6th</th>
<th>7th</th>
<th>8th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WomanPref</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amy</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ranking</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amy prefers man 3 to 6 since $\text{ranking}[3] < \text{ranking}[6]$

```
for i = 1 to n
  ranking[pref[i]] = i
```